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ABSTRACT
This book review compares two recent titles on copyright law: THE COPYRIGHT WARS:
THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC BATTLE by Peter Baldwin, and COPYFIGHT:
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT REFORM by Blayne Haggart. Both
books are meticulously researched and carefully written, and each makes an
excellent addition to the literature on copyright. Contrasting both titles in this joint
review, however, helps to reveal a few respects in which each work is incomplete;
indeed, each book occasionally reads as a critique of the other. Baldwin’s book places
contemporary debates in a much deeper historical context, but in so doing overlooks
some of the unique challenges contemporary technology poses to the law as well as
the historically unprecedented obstacles that contemporary law raises to some forms
of socially valuable innovation. Haggart’s book, in contrast, maintains a narrower
focus on the contemporary era, yielding a superior accounting of the institutional and
social interests now at stake in the global copyright debate, but fails in some respects
to appreciate the ways in which the much lengthier course of historical development
constrains future copyright policy-making. The review concludes by suggesting some
respects in which both books might serve as valuable guides for copyright
policy-makers at both the national and international levels.
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TWO COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON COPYRIGHT’S PAST AND FUTURE IN
THE DIGITAL AGE
TIMOTHY K. ARMSTRONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The rules of intellectual property have muscled their way into everyday life over
the past generation. A host of unremarkable human behaviors—turning on a
computer,1 listening to a song,2 telling a friend about a news story, 3 watching
* © Timothy K. Armstrong 2016. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
B.A. 1989, M.P.Aff. 1993, J.D. 1993, The University of Texas at Austin; LL.M. 2005, Harvard Law
School. I wish to express my appreciation to the staff of the Jacob Burns Law Library at the George
Washington University School of Law for the courtesy extended during my academic leave, and to
gratefully acknowledge the research support of the Harold C. Schott Foundation. The present
manuscript benefited greatly from the comments of the participants in the University of Cincinnati
College of Law’s Summer 2015 Faculty Scholarship Workshop.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International
license, which allows free duplication and adaptation of this work so long as the provisions stated in
the license are observed.
To view a copy of the license, please visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. For the purposes of Section 3(a) of the said license,
proper attribution must include the name of the original author and the name of THE JOHN
MARSHALL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW as publisher, the title of the article, the
Uniform Resource Identifier of and/or hyperlink to the publisher’s site containing the article as
originally published, and, if applicable, credit indicating that the article has been used in a
derivative work.
1 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning
that loading a copy of computer operating system from hard drive into RAM memory, an essential
process that occurs automatically upon startup, creates a “copy” of the operating system that
infringes if unlicensed); 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2012) (recognizing statutory exception to software
copyright owners’ rights for copies made as an “essential step” in a computer’s ordinary operation).
The fact that a statutory exception is necessary to permit a computer to be powered up speaks
volumes about the scope of rights that copyright holders enjoy under the interpretation given to the
statute by cases like MAI Systems. Nevertheless, the United States government has sought to
export the MAI Systems rule by including provisions in recent copyright treaties specifying that
temporary reproductions in computer memory constitute “copies” of the underlying works. BLAYNE
HAGGART, COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT REFORM pp. 112, 122-23, 249
(2014).
2 Streaming a song over the Internet potentially implicates a copyright owner’s exclusive
performance and distribution rights, as well as its rights to digital audio transmission of a work.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)-(4), (6) (2012). Downloading a song for later playback may implicate the
reproduction right, but not the performance right, under the reasoning of cases such as United
States v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 71–75 (2d Cir. 2010). In addition, the temporary RAM copies that
necessarily accompany decompression of a digital work in the course of playback would be
potentially infringing under the reasoning of cases such as MAI Systems cited above, although the
downloader of an authorized copy from a service such as Apple’s iTunes surely acquires (at a
minimum) an implied license to make such temporary RAM copies as are necessary to consume the
work.
3 See Jeena Moon, The “Hot News” Misappropriation Doctrine, the Crumbling Newspaper
Industry, and Fair Use as Friend and Foe: What is Necessary to Preserve “Hot News”, 28 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 631, 640-41 (2011) (describing past attempts by Associated Press to compel
bloggers to pay licensing fees for quoting from AP news stories).
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television,4 and even brewing a cup of coffee5—all involve activities now potentially
regulated by copyright law.6 Furthermore, the penalties for triggering one of
copyright law’s hidden trip-wires in everyday life are severe, including money
damages that may far exceed the actual harm to a copyright holder 7 and are imposed
4 Compare American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (finding infringing a
system designed to permit users to watch recordings of television broadcasts) with Fox Broad. Co. v.
Dish Network, LLC, 114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (finding noninfringing a system that
enabled similar uses) and Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008) (same) and Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 467 U.S. 417 (1984).
5 In 2014, the manufacturer of the popular Keurig line of home coffee makers announced that
future versions of its product would be designed to function only with officially licensed coffee pods
and would not work with third-party products. See Karl Bode, Keurig Will Use DRM In New Coffee
Maker
To
Lock
Out
Refill
Market,
TECHDIRT,
(Mar.
3,
2014)
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140227/06521826371/keurig-will-use-drm-new-coffee-maker-tolock-out-refill-market.shtml [http://perma.cc/EYV9-XN3M]. The company reversed course the
following year in the face of public ridicule and consumer complaints. See Karl Bode, Keurig CEO
Sort Of (But Not Really) Apologizes For Company’s Ridiculous Foray Into Obnoxious Coffee DRM,
TECHDIRT, (May 8, 2015) https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150508/06582730934/keurig-ceo-sortapologizes-companys-ridiculous-foray-into-obnoxious-coffee-drm.html [http://perma.cc/XSR4-TTXN].
Although Keurig’s manufacturer abandoned its plan to use technology to control which coffee pods
consumers could use in its devices, its failed attempt broke no new legal ground. Manufacturers of
several other consumer products have sought to employ various mechanisms to limit
interoperability with competing manufacturers’ products. The strategy carries potential legal force
because a competitor who designs a product to bypass the authentication mechanism risks violating
the anticircumvention rules established by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”).
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012). The case law suggests that manufacturers have sought to use the
DMCA to ward off competition in connection with a wide assortment of consumer goods, although
the courts have rebuffed the worst attempts. See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g &
Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, 431 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (data tape
storage libraries); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004) (printer toner cartridges); Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (garage door openers).
6 PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC BATTLE p.
336 (Princeton University Press 2014) (“What seemed to most people like normal private activity—
browsing, downloading, mailing friends—turned out to be infringement.”); see also, e.g., JOHN
TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 1 (2011) (“On any given day, . . . even
the most law-abiding American engages in thousands of actions that likely constitute copyright
infringement”); id. at 2-4 (imagining a typical day in the life of a fictional university professor, by
the end of which the professor would have accrued over $12 million in potential statutory damages
and possible criminal liability for copyright infringement based on unremarkable everyday actions);
DEBORA J. HALBERT, THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT: THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS OF CULTURAL
CREATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 4 (2014) (“[T]he state becomes an advocate for a specific political
economy of intellectual property that has ramifications for the free flow of information, access to
knowledge, and the future of innovation. Intellectual property has always been, but has now more
visibly become, an issue of social justice.”); HAGGART, supra note 1, at 4 (Copyright has become “a
law that directly affects the daily lives of billions of individuals and strikes at the very heart of the
global economy and democratic society.”).
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012) (authorizing award of statutory damages in an amount not
less than $750 and up to $30,000 for each copyrighted work infringed); 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3) (2012)
(authorizing awards of statutory damages for violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
In the context of internet file-sharing, the statutory damages provisions have often been applied to
yield awards of damages far exceeding the plaintiff’s actual injury. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music
Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that award of $22,500 for each of 30 songs
defendant infringed, for a total of $675,000, did not offend due process principles); Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting defendant’s constitutional challenges
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despite innocent intent.8 Small wonder that proposals to further expand intellectual
property rules have sparked recent public opposition both in the United States 9 and
abroad.10
Peter Baldwin’s THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC
BATTLE and Blayne Haggart’s COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT REFORM illuminate how copyright law arrived at its present state and
occasionally hint at a more hopeful future. Both books adopt a comparative
approach, contrasting developments in several nations. Baldwin’s THE COPYRIGHT
WARS extends the comparison across a lengthy span of history, while Haggart’s
COPYFIGHT examines a single recent period in close detail. Baldwin’s book, grandiose
in its ambition, reflects copious documentary research, including careful parsing of
never-enacted legislative proposals from many nations. He argues that, contrary to
our conventional understanding, contemporary copyright debates do not rest on
uniquely modern concerns, but rather reflect still-unresolved conflicts that have
echoed again and again through the long history of copyright law. Haggart’s nimbler
book derives from dozens of interviews with negotiators and participants in recent
international copyright debates, focusing on the implementation of the two WIPO
Internet treaties11 of 1996 in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Haggart’s
thesis is that, in setting global copyright policy, the United States exercises less
hegemonic influence than is conventionally believed. He argues for a renewed focus
in copyright research on particular characteristics of different countries at the
to award of $9,250 for each of 24 songs defendant infringed, totaling $222,000); BMG Music v.
Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming award of $22,500 in damages for defendant’s
infringing download of 30 songs—at $750 per song, the statutory minimum).
8 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (“The
imposition of liability . . . even in the absence of an intention to infringe or knowledge of
infringement, is not unusual.”); Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931)
(“Intention to infringe is not essential under the act.”).
9 In late 2011 and early 2012, technology and public interest advocacy groups organized
protests against then-pending legislation (the so-called “Stop Online Piracy Act” or “SOPA”; and the
still more cumbersomely titled “Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Intellectual Property Act,” whose acronym, the “PROTECT-IP” Act, was commonly further
shortened to “PIPA”) that would have expanded the scope of potential liability for linking to foreign
web sites where copyright-infringing material may be located. The protests culminated in a massive
“internet blackout” on January 18, 2012, in which many of the most trafficked sites on the web
“went dark” for a day and encouraged their readers to contact Congress to oppose the SOPA and
PIPA legislation. The resulting flood of complaints led Congress to withdraw both bills in late
January. See BILL D. HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT AND
TECHNOLOGY 194–200 (2013); BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 296-97.
10 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a multilateral intellectual property treaty
negotiated in conditions of unusual secrecy, provoked a strong backlash that ultimately led to the
treaty being voted down by the European Parliament. See HERMAN, supra note 9, at 174–76;
Symposium, Understanding the Global Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 515 (2012); Hilary H. Lane, The Realities of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement, 21 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183 (2012); BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 358-59. The
Mexican Senate also voted to reject ACTA in 2011 after holding multiple public hearings and issuing
a scathing report condemning both the substance of the treaty and the secretive conditions
surrounding its negotiation. See infra notes 312-316 and accompanying text.
11 More formally, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, (Dec. 20, 1996), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186
U.N.T.S. 121; and the WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty, (Dec. 20, 1996), S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
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national level that create a space for policy autonomy and counterbalance the United
States’ demands for ever-stricter copyright protection.
The two volumes complement one another in ways their authors almost
certainly did not anticipate, with each partly redressing the occasional weakness in
the other. Baldwin’s insistent search for historical parallels to today’s controversies,
although generally insightful, leads him to overlook at least one clear break in
continuity that differentiates modern copyright debates from those that came
before—even though the conditions before and after that break are faithfully
recounted in THE COPYRIGHT WARS. In contrast, Haggart’s focus on the modern era
yields a more accurate accounting of the copyright interests now in play and the ways
those interests depart from past patterns. In general, Haggart appears to have a
clearer understanding of copyright’s effect on technological innovation. Although
Haggart takes pains not to overstate his case, however, COPYFIGHT nevertheless
seems eager to put a hopeful gloss on some fairly ambiguous and equivocal
developments to imply broader consequences from what even Haggart’s own research
suggests may be isolated and atypical recent events. Here, Baldwin’s deeper
historical perspective cautions against over-reading a handful of recent developments
against copyright’s longer trend line, and suggests that future policy alternatives
remain far less “up for grabs” than Haggart believes. Each book individually makes
a welcome and highly valuable contribution to the literature on copyright, and these
contributions are amplified when the two are considered together.
Parts II and III of this review examine Baldwin’s and Haggart’s books,
respectively, in greater depth, with comparative and concluding observations to
follow in Part IV.
II. “COPYRIGHT” VERSUS “AUTHORS’ RIGHTS”: A 300-YEAR PHILOSOPHICAL DUEL
Peter Baldwin’s THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC
BATTLE seeks to demonstrate that battles over copyright in the digital era represent
mere echoes of a much older “clash of civilizations”12 over the nature of artistic
creation. That battle may find its contemporary expression in debates over Internet
file-sharing, but its roots, Baldwin shows, reach back into eighteenth-century
arguments over the public interest in art and literature, the role of creative
individuals in cultural development, and the nature of private property itself.
Baldwin’s impressive research (documented in over one hundred pages of notes)
weaves together topics as diverse as Roman and feudal property theory, the laws of
divorce and inheritance in Napoleonic France, the freewheeling postbellum American
pirate publishing industry, filmmaking in Nazi Germany, global trade agreements,
the remaking of the European political system after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
the digital revolution. Baldwin’s prose is lean and witty, and he has a keen eye for
the absurdities that copyright’s history supplies in abundance. The story of copyright
is, at bottom, a story of art, money, and power; and even readers who are ultimately
not persuaded by Baldwin’s broader historical thesis may find themselves chuckling
at the cavalcade of avaricious publishers, feckless romantics, scheming heirs,

12

BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 16.
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murderous despots, faithless spouses, partisan zealots, hucksterish impresarios,
canny statesmen, and cyber-utopian anarchists who populate his account.
The plan of Baldwin’s book is largely chronological, with periodic deviations
from a strictly linear ordering to allow related concepts to be considered together.
His first chapter sets forth the two competing theories of the role of authorship that
he labels “authors’ rights” and “copyright,” summarizing the most salient
characteristics of each—no small feat in itself, given the differing philosophical roots,
moral imperatives, and practical implications that characterize each of the two
strands of thought. Then begins the deep dive into the past that will eventually lead
the reader back to the surface near the end of the book. Baldwin’s book is a story of
how the “authors’ rights” and “copyright” perspectives shared many common points of
view in the eighteenth century (Chapter 2), then began following very different paths
in the nineteenth century (Chapter 3). The gap between the two systems widened
into a chasm over most of the twentieth century, reaching its furthest point in the
decades immediately following the Second World War (Chapters 4–6). Then
something unusual happened: beginning in the last few decades of the twentieth
century, the gap between the two systems rapidly closed—driven by new
international agreements and a remarkable policy volte-face by the United States,
then the world’s leading copyright exporter (Chapters 6–7). As the twenty-first
century dawned, however, the appearance of harmony dissolved under the ruthless
disintermediating logic of the digital communications revolution, ushering in the era
of renewed conflict in which we now reside (Chapter 8).
Readers who have followed any of this history from the “copyright” perspective,
especially those who believe in the importance of preserving the public domain
against excessive proprietary encroachment, will find reading Baldwin’s book to be a
little like watching a documentary about a doomed military mission, or a
reenactment of the last hours of a sunken ocean liner: we know this is a story that
doesn’t end well. It is a testament to Baldwin’s skill that his book maintains its
clinical distance and historical perspective even while reporting on ever-morealarming events; but make no mistake: this is a book about the decline and fall of
copyright. A well-told disaster epic, but a disaster story all the same.
Baldwin’s overarching thesis—raised early in the book, if largely sidelined for
three hundred pages thereafter—is that contemporary debates over copyright in the
digital era raise fewer novel issues than their participants commonly assume.
Historians like Baldwin profess to be “allergic” to claims that ‘Everything Is Different
This Time.’13 To the contrary, Baldwin asserts, we are rehashing many of the same
debates our forebears had. When law professor and public-interest advocate
Lawrence Lessig clashed with the late Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) lobbyist Jack Valenti before Congress over consumers’ rights in recordings
they had purchased,14 their respective positions and supporting arguments would
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 320.
See Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003: Transcript of Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
(May 12, 2004), at 45:
Mr. STEARNS: Does the consumer have the right to make a single copy of a
DVD and a CD for his own fair use, yes or no?
Mr. LESSIG: Can I say “absolutely yes”?
....
13
14
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have been instantly recognizable to British parliamentarians Thomas Babington
Macaulay and Thomas Noon Talfourd, who waged a spirited public debate on
copyright in the House of Commons in the 1830s and 1840s. 15 As Baldwin wrote,
“Chronologically blinkered as we all are, the digital generation thinks it is fighting
for the first time a battle that, in fact, stretches back three centuries.”16 Even the
features we might view as hallmarks of modern copyright discourse—arguments over
the disruptive force of technology, information overload, collective authorship, and
the value of a free flow of information—all find grounding in past debates.17 The goal
of illuminating parallels between contemporary and past conflicts animates
Baldwin’s analysis and gives THE COPYRIGHT WARS its strength and structure.
Unfortunately, as discussed below, it also accounts for the book’s single greatest flaw.
First, however, I will examine Baldwin’s argument.
A. Authors’ Rights versus Copyright
By Baldwin’s reckoning, we are currently embarking on the fourth century of a
titanic debate over two competing visions of the role of the arts and artists in society.
On one side stand those who believe that art is an extension of the personality of the
artist who created it. The work continues to reflect on the artist even after it has
been sold and published; the work is, in a legal sense, a small piece that has been
detached from the artist and released into the world, yet remains connected with the
artist by invisible bonds. Because of the intimate connection between artist and
work, the artist deserves not only pecuniary remuneration, but ongoing control over
how the work is used. If a songwriter objects to her song being played at campaign
rallies for a political candidate she dislikes, or a playwright objects to his play being
performed by nonwhite actors, adherents of this view maintain that the creator’s
wishes should prevail.18 Baldwin quotes the views of French jurist Bernard Edelman
on the shared, unified interest of the creator and her creation: “Since the work
embodies the author’s personality, harming it also attacks its creator.”19 So powerful
are creators’ interests, in this view, that they should enjoy even the ability to rewrite
their own histories, withdrawing works they no longer endorse (or now find
embarrassing or inconvenient) from public circulation in order to protect their own
reputations.20
Mr. VALENTI: No, he does not under the law.
Id.
15 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 109-12. Lessig’s position is Macaulay’s, and Valenti stands in for
Talfourd in the referenced exchange. The difference being that in the House of Commons,
Macaulay’s view prevailed. See also infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
16 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 13.
17 Id. at 320-24.
18 See id. at 1-2. Baldwin offers several illustrative examples of attempts by creators (some
successful, some not; some flowing from seemingly benign motives and some from reprehensible
ones) to exercise ongoing control over how their works are used. The celebrated Asphalt Jungle
case, long a fixture of copyright casebooks in the United States for its treatment of the droit moral
under French law, is recounted in some detail in BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 47-50.
19 Id. at 45.
20 Id. at 34-35; see also id. at 240-41 (from this perspective, authors’ preferences outweigh “[a]ll
other considerations—whether public preference or historical accuracy”).
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On the other side stand those who believe that there is no art without an
audience, whose views also demand consideration. Art both reflects and drives
culture, and is enmeshed inextricably in the society that nurtured the artist. That
society—not just the gaggle of artists who happened to produce individual expressive
works—has a collective stake in its own patrimony and may assert interests that
compete with, or even sometimes trump, the artist’s own. The value of art arises
from its capacity to inspire, inform, entertain, and enlighten. Creators deserve rights
in their creations not for their own sake, but because doing so improves the culture of
which they are a part. Where granting rights in an artist’s work furthers the public
interest, rights should be granted; where it does not, rights should be limited. The
law’s ultimate goal is the enlargement of the public sphere; remunerations and
royalties given to artists may be justified to, but only to, the extent that they
contribute to that goal.
Baldwin labels the former perspective “authors’ rights” and the latter
“copyright.” The legal regimes that have grown up under each approach feature both
commonalities and striking differences. Highlighting the differences between the
two is a task that occupies all of Baldwin’s first chapter, and indeed continues
throughout the book. To briefly summarize several of the contrasts between the two
philosophies that are explicated in Baldwin’s account:
Issue
Origin of rights
Protections for authors
Term of protection
Objective

Authors’ Rights
Natural law
Strong
Long or perpetual
Quality of works

Alienability of rights
Protected interests of
public
Philosophical basis

Limited
None

Most controversial aspect
Cultural values

Moral rights
High culture
Elitist
Exclusive
Individualist
France; Germany;
United States
(today)

Typified by

Romanticism

Copyright
Positive law
Moderate
Limited
Availability of
works
Full
Substantial
Enlightenment;
Postmodernism
Work made for hire
Mass education
Populist
Democratic
Collectivist
Great Britain;
United States (past)

For adherents of the authors’ rights viewpoint, control over one’s artistic
creations is a basic human right arising from principles of natural law. This view
finds expression in, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
proclaims that “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
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the author.”21 Because authors’ rights are grounded in notions of personhood and
natural law, their underlying rationale suggests that they are inalienable; one can no
more sell an aspect of one’s personality than one can sell oneself into slavery. 22 The
same logic suggests that authors’ rights should be effectively unending. Plato and
Aristotle may be gone, but their works endure, and therefore so does the unbreakable
connection with the works’ creators that the authors’-rights philosophy exists to
protect. In practice, the laws in authors’ rights jurisdictions do not always live up to
these ideals; even in France and Germany, copyrights eventually expire. But the
underlying natural law principles upon which authors’ rights rest suggest that rights
should be very strong, inalienable, and perpetual.
The copyright viewpoint rejects natural rights in favor of a more limited set of
property interests grounded in positive law. Rights under copyright laws exist solely
by legislative sufferance. In enacting copyright statutes, legislatures act from a
desire to benefit not only authors, but also the public at large, whose interests lie in
the widespread availability of an inexpensive assortment of expressive materials.
Copyright legislation therefore necessarily represents a balancing of competing
demands, with the claims of both authors and audiences recognized as legitimate. 23
Achieving the proper balance entails tradeoffs: authors need rights lest the fear of
piracy dissuade them from creating expressive works (and thereby deprive society of
the works they would have created), but those rights must be subject to limitations
that promote “the Enlightenment ideal of an expansive public domain”24 (such as the
familiar “fair use” rule in the United States). Rights must last long enough to ensure
authors a fair return, but not so long as to deprive the public of the benefits afforded
by free access to its own cultural commons. Thus, perpetual protection, of the sort
that the authors’-rights logic supports, is off the table. 25 To maximize the public
availability of works, authors should be able to assign their rights by contract to
publishers, whose mass dissemination capabilities will presumably exceed authors’
own. Because copyright understands rights as primarily commercial rather than

21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 27(2) (1948); see also HAGGART, supra note 1, at
204 (identifying this provision as the international basis for Mexican copyright law). But cf.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 325 (“Despite the claims that property is based on natural rights, in
practice its possession hinges entirely on the rights granted owners in statute.”).
22 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 44-45.
23 This perspective, too, is enshrined in international law. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty,
pmbl., (Dec. 20, 1996), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 (“Recognizing the need to
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly
education, research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention”); HAGGART,
supra note 1, at 117. Nevertheless, Baldwin reports, European observers seem to be puzzled by the
tendency in United States copyright scholarship to treat authors’ and audiences’ interests as
antagonistic and the law as the product of “a tense negotiation.” BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 16. The
authors’ rights framework essentially recognizes only the author’s interests as legitimate.
Europeans recognize that “the public eventually benefits when authors are treated well,” Id., but
that is merely a happy side effect and emphatically not the purpose of the law from Europeans’ point
of view.
24 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 11.
25 Expressly so, in the case of the United States, whose Constitution authorizes the creation of
intellectual property rights only for “limited times.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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personal in nature, even corporate bodies should be able to claim copyrights in the
works produced by their employees under the work-for-hire rule.26
Each side finds in the other much to dislike. Advocates of the copyright system
argue that, by providing incentives that are sufficient (but not greater than
necessary) to induce authors to create, copyright promotes creativity and economic
efficiency and ultimately feeds the public domain to the benefit of all. To its
detractors, however, copyright is “philistine and commercial, treating noble creation
as a mere commodity.”27 Advocates of the authors’-rights perspective celebrate its
power to shield creators against crass economic exploitation based upon “eternal
verities of natural rights.”28 To its critics, however, the authors’-rights approach
coddles artists, disserves the public, ossifies cultural development, and dampens
innovation.29
The strongest difference between the two perspectives concerns the treatment of
what have come to be known as the “moral rights” of authorship. Because the
authors’ rights perspective treats works as extensions of their creators’ personalities,
it provides many sorts of protections for works that collectively aim to ensure that
the works reflect favorably upon their creators. These include: (1) the author’s right
to be named as the creator of a work and to remove her name from a work she no
longer wishes to be associated with (known generally as the rights of attribution and
non-attribution, respectively); (2) the rights to choose whether to disclose a work to
the public or to withdraw a previously disclosed work (known respectively as the
rights of disclosure, and withdrawal or repenting); and (3) the right to insist that a
work be presented unchanged in a manner of the author’s choosing (known as the
right of integrity). These rights are known as moral rights not because of any
concern over morality as such, but merely to differentiate them from the economic
rights that are the core concern of copyright.30 A further moral right straddles the
line with economic rights: many jurisdictions give authors the right to share in the
proceeds of any re-sales of their works (which may become quite substantial for
works of fine art that appreciate in value over time), known variously as the resale
royalty right or the droit de suite.31
Moral rights fit comfortably within the authors’ rights philosophy, but coexist
uneasily with copyright principles. Baldwin’s book selects four nations as his
exemplars for each of the two competing perspectives: Great Britain and the United
States as illustrative of the Anglo-American copyright philosophy (with other
onetime colonies of the British Commonwealth making a few appearances), and
France and Germany as representing the authors’ rights philosophy of Continental
Europe (again, with occasional detours to other jurisdictions, most prominently
Italy). Baldwin writes that “[t]he Trans-Atlantic spat over authors’ rights is thus
part of a broader quarrel that has long pitted the Continent against the Anglo-Saxon
26 See BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 22-28 (discussing several differences between the authors’
rights and copyright perspectives).
27 Id. at 15.
28 Id.; see also id. at 17 (noting that European observers commonly refer to what they call “the
‘producer’s copyright,’ an instrument of industrial policy corresponding to the Americans’ fondness
for competition”).
29 Id. at 15.
30 Id. at 29–36, 146–53.
31 Id. at 29.
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world, or more narrowly, the French against the Americans.”32 Despite overall
expansion of the authors’-rights viewpoint over time, Baldwin finds, “these disputes
persist even today.”33
B. From Harmony to Discord: Copyright in the 18th and 19th Centuries
An argument that the United States and France are locked in battle over
authors’ rights naturally invites the question: compared to what? Compared,
Baldwin answers, to a state of relative harmony that existed in the 18th century,
when both copyright law and America itself were new. Copyright legislation of that
era rested upon premises that were very broadly shared among Britain, France,
Germany, and the United States. Baldwin writes:
Everywhere, legislators sought to curb publishers’ privileges and vest
rights to works instead in their authors. All regarded works as
property justified by natural rights because of the authors’ labor.
Authors, all agreed, were entitled to benefit when they sold their
works to publishers.34
Eighteenth-century copyright laws also shared the goal of a “swift and efficient
transfer of works into the public domain.”35 Therefore, copyright terms were short,
relative to contemporary standards: 14 years in Britain and the U.S., and 5-10 years
following the death of the author in France.
Publishers, however, agitated for longer and stronger rights in order to ward off
competition from the cheaper editions that inevitably appeared once a book’s
copyright expired. This sparked what became known as the “Battle of the
Booksellers” in Britain and the United States—a moment that is pivotal in Baldwin’s
account (and which is invoked by analogy frequently throughout THE COPYRIGHT
WARS) because it marked the first clear philosophical divergence between
Continental and Anglo-American law. In Britain and the United States, the Battle of
the Booksellers ended with a decisive rejection of a “natural law” approach to
copyright, inaugurating a very long period of resistance in those countries to
arguments predicated upon authors’ inherent rights in their works. In contrast,
natural rights arguments took firm root on the Continent, setting the stage for the
transformation of French and German law over the ensuing century and a half. 36
In the 16th and 17th centuries, publishers (such as Britain’s Stationers Guild—
later the Stationers Company) benefited from royal privileges granting them the
exclusive rights to print works within a given territory. This state of affairs was not
wholly satisfactory to the publishers: they faced ongoing competition from other
publishers’ editions imported from outside the territory covered by their privilege, as
well as arguments with authors over whether new editions of previously published
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 22.
Id. at 52.
34 Id. at 53.
35 Id. at 53-54.
36 Id. at 54.
32
33
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works required new permission from (and compensation to) the author. 37 Seeking to
strengthen their own position, publishers on both sides of the Channel began to
argue that authors held “a common law or natural rights claim to their works in
perpetuity”—rights to which they, the publishers, succeeded by assignment from the
author.38 This view made the royal privileges conferred upon the publishers
effectively unnecessary: publishers succeeded to authors’ own natural, inherent
rights in their works.
Authors, of course, were happy to agree with publishers that their rights were
natural, inherent, perpetual, and not created by royal decree—the same as real
property.39 They were probably less enamored of the publishers’ next rhetorical
move, which was to argue that, because authors’ rights were like any other form of
property, those rights necessarily were fully alienable, and publishers themselves
stepped into the authors’ shoes when they purchased a work.40 Yet, even as they
argued for authors’ perpetual rights based upon natural law, publishers undermined
their own claims of complete alienability of rights, for “assignees could never pretend
to the same ineffably personal connection with the work” that they insisted authors
had.41
Others rejected the argument that principles of natural law justified extending
strong rights to authors (and, by extension, their assignees). Rival publishers,
particularly those who specialized in producing cheaper unauthorized editions of
works, saw the “natural rights” argument as simply the self-interested, self-serving
rationalizations of the grasping monopolists higher up the food chain. These smaller
publishers, along with some jurists and legal philosophers, argued that it was instead
up to the state to decide whether and how to grant rights to authors—a question that
ought to be guided not only by concern for authors, but also by the interests of the
public in education and entertainment. Those who rejected the natural-rights
argument also argued that the value of expressive works arose only when they were
disseminated; unpublished manuscripts brought their creators neither pecuniary
reward nor popular acclaim.42 Thus, as Baldwin summarizes the terms of the debate:
The fundamental dispute that was to run throughout the copyright
wars for the following three centuries emerged early. Was there
something natural and inherent in authors’ claims to their works?
Could authors, and by assignment their publishers, therefore demand
perpetual rights or extensive protection, much as homeowners could
over their houses? Or were literary property rights a mere grant of a

Id. at 54-55.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 56.
39 Id. at 57-60.
40 Id. at 61, 67 (“[i]n selling his work, the author put the bookseller ‘in his own place.’”).
41 Id. at 62. Thus, neither side in the “Battle of the Booksellers” appeared to understand its
own long-term interests: authors argued for strong property rights even though these rights would
redound ultimately to the benefit of their assignees, and publishers argued for rights based on
characteristics that were intrinsic to authors’ personalities even though this introduced a conceptual
distinction between authors’ and publishers’ interests.
42 Id. at 62-65.
37
38
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temporary monopoly, resting on society’s judgment of what authors
deserved?43
Although the Court of King’s Bench in 1769 accepted the publishers’ arguments
that their common-law rights of copyright continued to exist independently of the
1710 Statute of Anne (the precursor of modern copyright statutes),44 the publishers’
victory was short-lived. Just five years later, the House of Lords’ celebrated decision
in Donaldson v. Beckett firmly rejected a natural-rights theory of perpetual literary
property. Authors’ common-law rights were extinguished once they elected to
publish their works—after that point, the authors’ interests in mass dissemination
(and mass royalties) had to be balanced against “the social benefit of diffusing
knowledge,” which “ought to be as free and general as air or water.”45 Thus, the
Lords declared, booksellers could not succeed to any form of perpetual literary
property that authors might have enjoyed before publication; instead, they received
only the limited 14-year term of protection provided under the statute. Sixty years
later, the United States Supreme Court agreed with Donaldson’s rejection of natural
rights, declaring in Wheaton v. Peters that authors had only those rights in published
works that Congress had elected to provide as a matter of statute.46 Anglo-American
copyright law thus stood united in the view that copyright was a government grant,
not a natural right; and that in electing to grant authors rights in their works the
government was free to impose conditions that would benefit the broader public, such
as a relatively short term of protection. A shared “utilitarian vision of promoting the
common good of learning and enlightenment by rewarding the creator justly, but
temporarily”47 led to the enactment of statutes on both sides of the Atlantic that
aimed to serve the “general social interest of enlarging the public domain.”48
For a time, even Continental copyright laws followed the Anglo-American model.
The French revolutionaries, building off a 1777 decree that had declared that
assignees could hold only temporary (not perpetual) rights in literary works, enacted
statutes in 1791 and 1793 that followed the example of the Statute of Anne and the
Donaldson v. Beckett decision. The French statutes conferred express rights on
authors, but only for a period that was temporally limited, not perpetual. The
revolutionaries’ goals, similar to those expressed in both Britain and the United
States, were to feed the public domain and spread knowledge by ensuring public
access to “multiple editions and lower prices” for popular works. Conferring property
rights on authors also strengthened their hand as against publishers, whose
monopolies offended revolutionary sensibilities; as Baldwin puts it, “[p]roperty made

Id. at 64-65.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 65-67.
45 Id. at 68. The quotation from the statement of Lord Camden was echoed many years later by
Justice Brandeis, who famously wrote that “the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the
air to common use.” International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (“Congress, then, by [the Copyright Act of 1790], instead of
sanctioning an existing right, . . . created it.”); BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 71-72.
47 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 69.
48 Id. at 72-73.
43
44
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the author an equal citizen with all the other independent owners who, in the French
social imagination, constituted society’s backbone.”49
The German territories took a different approach, guided by the lingering
influence of Roman thinking (which resisted treating intangible goods as a form of
property) and later by the writings of philosophers Immanuel Kant and Johann
Gottlieb Fichte. German thinking treated publishers as the contractual agents of
authors, not as holders of property rights of their own. Presaging the later
development of personality-based theories of authors’ rights, German thinking
generally viewed rights in literary works as personal to their creator, and not
assignable as other forms of property were.50
Contradictions between literary property and ordinary property, which the
German approach largely sidestepped, began to pull Continental authors’-rights law
in a very different direction from Anglo-American copyright law. Identifying the
precise nature of literary rights proved increasingly important as copyright laws
expanded to cover more categories of works and to provide more types of rights,
however, because of the very different consequences for authors and publishers of the
competing characterizations. As applied to expressive works, “property” is a
metaphor, but an imperfect one—there are many respects in which expressive works
were “commonly recognized as different”51 from other forms of property. First, if
publishers were the “purchasers” of literary works, then why should they not be
entitled to dispose of their property however they chose, irrespective of the wishes of
the author who sold it to them? Could not a publisher change the work, alter or
destroy it, give it a new title, or even replace the author’s name with their own? If
not, why not? Did not limiting the publisher’s rights as a purchaser call into question
the “property” metaphor upon which authors and publishers alike had insisted the
century before? Second, to the extent literary property was treated as analogous to
ordinary property, then why should the owner’s rights not last forever? Requiring
copyrights to expire after a certain time, as even Continental laws mandated,
appeared to stand in considerable tension with the principle that literary works were
a form of property.52 These were the debates that preoccupied copyright law in the
19th century, and the very different answers that gradually emerged on the
Continent and in the English-speaking nations offered a stark preview of the deeper
schisms still to come.
Early on, British law developed one way to differentiate literary rights from
other forms of property, to wit, the principle that rights in a literary work were
separate from rights in the physical objects (e.g., books) in which the work was
contained.53 Cleaving rights in “works” from rights in physical articles was an
essential step in copyright’s evolution, Baldwin writes, for “[o]nly by fundamentally
separating the work as an object from its intellectual content could the author retain
rights to something that, in its physical incarnation, he had evidently released” to the
publisher and the world.54 That legal distinction solved one problem while
Id. at 73-76.
Id. at 76-80. Vestiges of this early approach survive today in the German rule that authors’
literary rights are inalienable; publishers receive only contractual use rights. Id. at 146.
51 Id. at 83.
52 Id. at 95-96.
53 This distinction is preserved today in 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
54 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 85.
49
50
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introducing others: if authors owned rights in their works even after selling their
manuscripts, what did the authors retain? Debates over what attributes, if any,
remained with authors even after they had relinquished control of their works to
assignees provided an opportunity for new personality-based theories of authors’
rights to take hold. Even in Britain, statutes began to recognize non-economic rights
in authors’ works: Baldwin describes the creation of a rudimentary moral right of
integrity in the Engravers Act of 1735, which forbade not only exact copies but
reproductions featuring only minor alterations to expressive works, and a clear
adoption of an attribution right in the 1862 Fine Art Copyright Act. 55 British case
law, too, began to recognize integrity interests of authors in their works, as
illustrated by the common-law development of a “fair abridgment” doctrine extending
authors’ control to inexact copies of their works. 56
Baldwin finds evidence of a clear divergence between 19th-century British and
Continental European views on the issue of literary property in the form of two
debates that occurred nearly contemporaneously: the French parliament’s
consideration of a strong authors’-rights bill introduced by deputy Alphonse de
Lamartine in 1841, and the British parliament’s consideration of a series of proposals
to strengthen copyright protection introduced by MP Thomas Noon Talfourd between
1837 and 1842. Although both sets of bills failed, they had very different
consequences for their respective jurisdictions: the ideas underlying Lamartine’s
proposal came to be broadly accepted on the Continent, while the decisive rejection of
Talfourd’s proposals colored both British and American thinking for over a century. 57
In France, Baldwin describes Lamartine as “in thrall to the idea that authors
had natural property rights to their works,” which he personally believed should
endure in perpetuity, although the bill he proposed was more circumspect. 58
Lamartine’s proposal combined proposals on copyright duration (which he suggested
extending from ten to fifty years after the author’s death) with new rules on the
descent and inheritance of literary rights. Supporters of the proposal declared
literary works to be the purest and “most personal” form of property insofar as it
existed solely because of the exercise of the author’s will and remained intimately
(and, some argued, inalienably) connected with the author.
But French
parliamentary deputies objected to Lamartine’s ideas, noting that lengthy,
inheritable terms for literary property impaired the public availability of works
which existing French law sought to assure. Instead, Lamartine’s bill would
essentially leave works in the hands of authors’ families, heirs, and creditors, who
might decide to suppress the work or to offer it in editions that the authors
themselves would not have approved of. Seeking a compromise that would allow the
bill to pass, Lamartine accepted a plan to “rein in the work’s full alienability” because
of the work’s intensely personal connection with its creator. Under the proposed
compromise, the economic interests in a work would for the first time be divided from
authors’ ongoing rights to control how their work was used, based upon what
55 Id. at 90. The Engravers Act also prefigured the modern idea/expression dichotomy in
copyright by forbidding the holder of rights in any particular illustration to preclude other
illustrations of the same underlying subject. Id. at 86–87. This principle, too, survives today. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
56 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 90-91.
57 Id. at 98-101, 109-12.
58 Id. at 98.
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Lamartine labeled “considérations morales.” The authors’ heirs and creditors could
succeed to the author’s economic, but not moral interests.59
Although even this compromise was too radical a change for then-existing
French law, as it set the terms of debate for a century thereafter. Lamartine and his
supporters lost the battle, yet in some sense won the war. Gradually, driven partly
by the influence of the Romantic movement and its “celebration of heroic creators,”60
the arguments articulated by Lamartine and his supporters began to be accepted in
French case law, which carved out new non-economic protections for authors. The
notion that authors enjoyed inalienable moral rights in their work that survived even
the author’s own death swiftly became an accepted part of French jurisprudence,
although it required the better part of a century for them to be enacted into statutory
law.61 Only “faint echoes” remained in Europe—voiced by relatively marginal figures
such as French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (of “property is theft!” fame)—of
the once-strong principle that copyright law should serve public ends. 62
Meanwhile, across the Channel, British parliamentarians took up a series of
proposals by jurist Thomas Noon Talfourd “to strengthen and lengthen copyright.”63
In Parliament and the press, heated debates ensued over the nature of literary
property: whether it was a natural right inherent in the concept of authorship, or
whether it was a limited power granted on behalf of the public who was its ultimate
beneficiary. This was the backdrop for Baron Macaulay’s famous characterization of
copyright as a form of monopoly and “a ‘tax on readers for the purpose of giving a
bounty to writers.’”64 Towering establishment figures like Macaulay, not just a
proletarian rabble, spoke for the interests of a reading public in wider access to
cheaper editions of popular works. 65 Talfourd’s proposal to extend the British
copyright term to sixty years following the death of the author was pruned back to
life-plus-seven in the face of opposition from Macaulay and others. Later attempts to
revive Talfourd’s arguments in hearings before the British Copyright Commission in
the 1870s yielded still another defeat, with the Commission rejecting radical reform
in favor of maintaining copyright’s focus on the needs of the public. 66
In nineteenth-century United States, a minimalist approach to copyright (and
intellectual property in general) was publicly justified as “a purposeful attempt to
jumpstart a new, more enlightened and democratic polity.”67 United States law had
consistently denied all protection to foreign authors and inventors, whose works as a
result were widely copied. Channeling Macaulay, American civic leaders rejected
foreign authors’ demands for copyright protection as an attempt to impose “‘a tax on
knowledge,’” and argued that American democracy itself—based as it was on
Id. at 98-102.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 94; see also id. at 130-31.
61 Id. at 103-06. Baldwin finds that the French debate was little influenced by German thinking
on authors’ rights, of which the French deputies appear to have been “largely ignorant.” Id. at 103.
German theorists nevertheless were busily developing a robust personality-based theory of
protecting authors’ rights, which would come to influence Continental thinking greatly in the
twentieth century. Id. at 106-09.
62 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 122-24.
63 Id. at 110.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 125.
66 Id. at 110-12, 244-45.
67 Id. at 114.
59
60
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principles of widespread (if still far from universal) suffrage and mass public
education—depended for its efficacy “on affordable and easily available literature.”68
Disregard of foreign copyrights served domestic economic interests as well, as the
United States mass-market publishing industry swiftly outgrew its British
counterpart, which remained focused on satisfying the relatively modest needs of
British libraries.69 Foreign authors (most famously Charles Dickens, who offended
his American hosts during his tour of the United States in 1842 by angrily
condemning the rampant piracy of his works), and even a few American ones, argued
that common decency required the United States to bring its copyright laws up to
international standards. Economic injury, not moral suasion, finally brought the
American publishing industry around: when British publishers produced cheap,
unauthorized copies of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s antislavery bestseller Uncle Tom’s
Cabin to meet surging domestic demand, it gave the Americans “a taste of their own
medicine, highlighting the advantages of international [copyright] agreements.”70
The United States finally extended protection to works of foreign authors in the
Copyright Act of 1891.71
The signal development of the nineteenth century, in Baldwin’s account, was the
formation of the Berne Union in 1886—a seismic event whose aftershocks still
reverberate today. Berne’s origins lay in the International Literary Congress, which
was held in Paris in 1878 and dominated by representatives of Continental European
nations. (The British attended with some reluctance, and the United States
boycotted the event.) The attendees overwhelmingly reflected the authors’-rights end
of the spectrum of global thinking—all agreed that literary rights “were not a
concession of law but a form of property given by nature,” with only the British
delegates demurring from this characterization as inconsistent with domestic
statutory and case law.72 Reflecting a pattern that would later be followed with
68 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 114; see also id. at 161 (quoting an 1873 report of the
Congressional Committee on the Library declaring international copyright protection to be “‘a
hindrance to the diffusion of knowledge among the people and to the cause of universal education’”);
see also id. at 162 (quoting an 1891 statement by U.S. Senator Richard Coke, of Texas, warning that
international copyright laws would create “an embargo on the spread of intelligence, on the diffusion
of literature, on the spread of education among our people”). Indeed, even some European thinkers
accepted that the benefits of an educated citizenry outweighed authors’ legitimate interests in
exclusive rights. See id. at 112, 124-25. Even philosopher John Locke, whose writings are often said
to underlie natural-rights arguments for property, “favored a limited copyright term, believing that
a perpetual property right in books threatened to harm the spread of learning.” Id. at 55-56; see also
HAGGART, supra note 1, at 66 (copyright laws both in the United States and internationally fitted
“‘within traditions of republican political thought that viewed the circulation of information and
ideas as a positive social good—indeed, as a prerequisite of democratic culture.’”) (quoting Joe
Karaganis, Disciplining Markets in the Digital Age, in STRUCTURES OF PARTICIPATION IN DIGITAL
CULTURE 222, 228 (2007)).
69 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 115-19.
70 Id. at 121.
71 See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 13, 26 Stat. 1106, 1109 (generally conditioning protection
for foreign authors on their home jurisdiction’s reciprocal protection of United States works). Even
this accommodation to foreign authors was accompanied by a provision aimed at protecting the
American publishing industry: copyright protection attached only to works physically produced in
the United States. Id. § 3, 26 Stat. at 1107.
72 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 84. As noted previously, Anglo-American copyright law in this era
remained resolutely focused on enlarging the public domain, and rejected the natural-law theory on
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debates over ACTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,73 the like-minded nations of
the International Literary Congress sought to memorialize their shared viewpoints in
a new treaty. The result was the 1886 Berne Convention, 74 which “standardized the
treatment of works in foreign countries and set minimum levels of domestic
legislation that member nations were encouraged and sometimes required to meet.”75
Those minimum levels were, by Anglo-American standards, quite high, and came to
include requirements of robust protections for authors’ moral, not just economic,
interests in their works. Over time, “the maximalist position prevailed.”76
The effect of the Berne Union was to produce pressure for a constant one-way
upward ratcheting of authors’ rights in every country that joined. First, because the
authors’-rights philosophy defines only the interests of authors as relevant, it
contains no built-in limiting principle that may offset authors’ demands for everstronger protection. Second, on a more practical level, Berne membership creates in
every nation a constituency of authors demanding that the nation match the highest
levels of protection available elsewhere in the world: “If protection was better abroad,
why should domestic authors settle for less?”77 As later revisions to the Berne
Convention expanded authors’ control over derivative works, extended copyright to
new forms of expression, and curtailed or eliminated formalities (such as notice) for
copyright protection, these changes too came to propagate through the copyright laws
of member countries.78 In consequence, copyright has only expanded, in every
direction, in the Berne Union nations: it covers more works, provides more exclusive
rights, and lasts longer than ever.79 Most remarkably, copyright has continued to
grow even while ordinary property has shrunk, with property owners compelled to
accept greater limitations on their freedom of action to serve countervailing social
policies.80
Berne’s maximalist view of copyright led to a century-long boycott by the United
States, which did not formally join the Berne Union until March 1, 1989.81 Britain,
for its part, found itself torn between a desire to secure additional protections for
British authors on the Continent, and its disinclination further to antagonize the
which the Continental approach to authors’ rights rested. See supra notes 45-48, 63-66 and
accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 270-273 and accompanying text.
74 Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature
(Sept. 9, 1886), 6 U.S.T. 2731.
75 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 154.
76 Id. at 156.
77 Id. at 156. So powerful is this demand that it has even led the most-developed nations to
adopt levels of protection that exceed Berne’s already high requirements. See infra notes 121-126
and accompanying text.
78 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 156.
79 See id. at 128 (“By the cusp of the twentieth century, then, all nations had significantly
expanded authors’ rights in increasingly different ways.”); see also id. at 247 (noting that duration of
copyright in every country has been repeatedly increased over the past 300 years); see also id. at
303-04 (finding similar effects producing constant upward pressure on copyright rights within the
European Union); HAGGART, supra note 1, at 96 (copyright has “increased in strength and scope” for
over 200 years).
80 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 4 (“Intellectual property has in fact come to be treated more
favorably than its conventional cousins.”); id. at 6-7, 128, 398-405.
81 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 13(a), 102 Stat. 2853, 2861
(1988) (codified at note following 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)); Baldwin, supra note 6, at 160-61.
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still-hostile United States and its large audience of English-speaking readers.
Britain’s response, in Baldwin’s view, was essentially to join Berne on a purely pro
forma basis while the British “fought a rearguard battle . . . to delay, dilute, and
deflect the full consequences of their membership.”82 In addition, the AngloAmerican nations began developing new legal mechanisms to offset the rising
strength of authors’ rights and restore the law’s focus on the public interest. These
included judge-made doctrines limiting owners’ powers to prevent certain types of
socially valuable uses of their works (known as “fair use” in the United States and
“fair dealing” in Britain and the Commonwealth),83 and compulsory licensing
mechanisms permitting even unauthorized uses upon payment of a specified
compensation to the copyright holder.84 Because these doctrines were inconsistent
with the maximalist view of authors’ rights, they never really took hold on the
Continent, but did serve to offset at least some of the Berne Convention’s constant
pressure for ever-stronger authorial control.85
C. Of War and Trade: Copyright in the 20th Century
By the early 1900s, with authors’ economic rights in their works secured by
statute in much of the world, attention began to turn increasingly to protecting
authors’ non-economic interests in their works (even as authors’ economic rights
continued their unstoppable expansion). In Baldwin’s account, two forces combined
most strongly in the latter half of the twentieth century to increase overall levels of
protection for both economic and moral rights. At first, in the decades immediately
following the Second World War, Europeans reacted avulsively to any ideas that
carried even the faintest whiff of fascist ideology—a reaction that appears to have
doomed any expressions of concern for the interests of the public in copyright law, yet
82 Id. at 154; see also id. at 159-60 (illustrating how British post-Berne laws, such as the 1911
copyright act, adhered to the letter of the Convention while simultaneously gutting its spirit). In
contrast, Haggart’s analysis treats Britain as generally supportive of Berne due to the mass copying
of British works in other countries. HAGGART, supra note 1, at 73.
83 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 135-38. After over a century of development as judge-made law,
the fair use doctrine was recognized by statute in the United States in the Copyright Act of 1976,
although it remains mostly judge-made in practice. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
84 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 138-41. In the United States, for example, songs that have been
once recorded with the composer’s authorization may be recorded (i.e., “covered”) by anyone else
upon payment of a compulsory licensing fee under the conditions specified in 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012);
see also BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 143 (summarizing history of sound recording compulsory
licensing).
85 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 137-38, 140-41.
Even today, the EU Copyright Directive
establishes a ceiling, rather than a floor, for “fair dealing” rights: it enumerates several possible
circumstances in which nations may permit copyrighted works to be used without authorization, but
all are optional save one. The only copyright exception the EU requires member states to recognize
(“shall be exempted”) is an exemption for “transient and incidental” electronic copies created as “an
integral and essential part of a technological process,” such as the copies made by servers situated
between an internet user and a site she has requested to view. See Directive on the harmonisation
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001/29/EC, O.J. L 167,
Art. 5 (2001); BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 138. As already mentioned, even this solitary, exceedingly
narrow, mandatory copyright exemption may go too far for the United States’ government’s liking
today. See supra note 1.
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oddly seems not to have extended to the fascists’ simultaneous embrace of moral
rights. Then, in perhaps the most dramatic about-face in copyright history, the
United States transformed itself in a short span of time from a weak opponent to an
enthusiastic proponent of strong international copyright protection. As the century
drew to a close, American economic might was joined to the cause of embedding
strong copyright protections in international law, backed for the first time by the
threat of trade sanctions for nations whose copyright laws fell short. Meanwhile,
even as it took steps to force its trading partners to strengthen their own copyright
regimes, the United States itself took an ill-considered leap into unknown territory,
enacting what has come (even if it was perhaps not originally intended) to be
history’s first-ever restriction on accessing expressive works in digital form even for
non-infringing purposes.
Baldwin illustrates how French and German legal thinking struggled, in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to reconcile the law’s recognition of
copyright rights as a form of property with their intuition, based on natural-law
principles, that authors should enjoy continuing control even over works they had
sold. French law recognized that all citizens, not just authors, enjoyed general rights
deriving from personhood—rights “to name, reputation, honor, privacy, and the
like.”86 It was only a small conceptual leap to conclude that treating expressive
works in certain ways could impair these personality-based interests of their authors
regardless of who held the property rights in the work. In Germany, even authors’
economic rights were declared to be inalienable; it was therefore an easy matter to
accommodate inalienable moral rights. 87 Germany enacted statutory protections for
moral rights earlier than France did, with “new laws on literature and music in 1901
and on art and photography in 1907” limiting the powers of copyright holders (such
as publishers, creditors, and other transferees) to use works in ways that their
authors objected to.88 Similarly, if more gradually, French courts began to separate
authors’ economic and moral interests in their works, and to hold the latter to be
inviolable and inalienable regardless of what happened to the former. 89 By the
1930s, strong moral rights protections existed throughout Western Europe.
Then the war came. Baldwin devotes a full chapter to the surprising roles
fascist ideology filled in copyright history: first in cementing moral rights protections
as a matter of international law, and then in launching them into the stratosphere as
postwar European governments competed to see who could most thoroughly
repudiate any lingering vestige of the fascists’ professed (if imaginary) concern with
the literary needs of the common volk. The chapter on fascism, regrettably, proves to
be one of the less satisfying parts of THE COPYRIGHT WARS for a variety of reasons.
First, Baldwin’s choice of France and Germany as his exemplars of the authors’rights perspective pays few dividends here; as his discussion makes clear, the real
action lay elsewhere (primarily in Italy which, remarkably, continued to pass new
copyright laws even as the war raged). Second, France, it need hardly be noted, had
more urgent concerns during the war years; if either the Vichy regime or La
Résistance devoted a moment’s thought to copyright policy, Baldwin does not say.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 145.
Id. at 145-46.
88 Id. at 157.
89 Id. at 145-53.
86
87
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Third, although German lawmakers debated an assortment of copyright proposals
before and during the Nazi era (the banality of evil, indeed!), none was enacted; and
by the time any consensus had begun to form on the proper scope of authors’ rights,
Germany, too, had far bigger troubles it had created for itself.
After Mussolini’s Italy enacted a strong moral rights statute in 1925, the
Italians trumpeted their accomplishment as a reflection of the glory and global
influence of Italian culture and “a signal cultural milestone.”90 When the Berne
Conference met in Rome three years later to consider revisions to the Berne
Convention, the Italian delegation argued forcefully (with vigorous support from
other Continental nations) for the addition of language mandating similar
protections for moral rights in all members of the Berne Union. The proposal met
with a chilly reception from Britain and the Anglophone nations, but the Italian
delegate skillfully threaded a rhetorical needle: he argued that, in truth, moral rights
were already effectively protected in the English-speaking countries, if not by
copyright, then by other forms of law.91 Thus, no new legislation would be needed to
bring the Anglophone nations’ laws into compliance with a new moral rights
provision in Berne. This proved satisfactory to the proposal’s detractors, and fascist
Italy succeeded in enshrining moral rights protections in international copyright
law.92
Hitler’s Third Reich offered less substantive law but a characteristic surplus of
bombast. In what would prove to be the death knell for a balanced approach to
copyright on the Continent, the Nazis articulated a communitarian, public-interested
rationale for protecting authors’ rights. In some respects, they were only expanding
on principles inherited from the Weimar Republic—for example, Germany’s 1933
implementation of the 1928 Berne revisions celebrated not a Romantic vision of
heroic individualism, but a collective society working to better itself through the
creation of works that venerated German culture. The Nazi era took these principles
and extended them still further in the service of collective social ends. As Baldwin
describes the idealized vision underlying German copyright proposals in this era:
The Nazi author should cultivate not a walled-off garden for the few
but a public park for all. Creator and community were inherently
intertwined . . . [b]y protecting the author, the folk protected itself. 93

90 Id. at 166.
Although Baldwin links these expressions of cultural pride to the “vibrantly
modernist and avant-garde” Italian fascists, who “saw themselves as rejuvenating moribund Italian
culture, with its glorious past, slothful present, and neglected future,” BALDWIN, supra note 6, at
168, the fact that virtually the same thinking underlies similar policies in present-day Mexico offers
the possibility of a more benign explanation than the one Baldwin gives. Cf. infra note 303 and
accompanying text.
91 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 167. In the United States, for example, concern with authors’
reputations and the integrity of their works may find protection under contract or trademark
principles. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). Defamation law,
too, stepped in to fill the moral rights gap in Anglophone nations. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 167.
Britain in 1952 took the position that its domestic laws already adequately protected moral rights
and that further legislation was unnecessary. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 225-26.
92 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 167-68.
93 Id. at 173.
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The idea that works must confer a social benefit was not an abstract ideal, but an
indispensable requisite of protection; “[a] work that set itself against the community,”
in the “community’s” view, risked suppression.94 Rights existed to protect not the
honor of the author, but of the work itself—with “honor” understood in a social,
collective sense of how well the work promoted the German community’s officially
sanctioned self-image.95 Creators, of course, recognized the Third Reich’s putative
encouragement of artistic creation for the sham it was, fleeing Nazi terror in vast
numbers and leaving Germany “a cultural desert.”96
Substantive German copyright law actually changed very little in the 1930s, and
not at all during the war years. 97 Legislative proposals were drafted and debated,
but none passed before the Third Reich crumbled. Baldwin devotes close attention to
the competing plans, but gleans little of value from them. Nazi thinkers, both
building on and repudiating their Weimar-era forebears, generally conceptualized
authors’ rights as serving collective ends, saw creativity as embedded in an
underlying social milieu rather than as an individualistic exercise, supported
compulsory licensing to foster greater public access to expressive works, enlisted
state authorities to preserve their own favored vision of artistic integrity, and favored
limiting rights to flesh-and-blood individuals rather than commercial enterprises. 98
These proposals differed only in degree, not in kind, from reforms considered before
the war in France, Belgium, Italy, Romania, Norway, and Denmark. 99 But, in an
unfortunate parallel, the significance of which would not be lost on postwar
European copyright reformers, “[t]he emphasis in Nazi ideology on public access
echoed the Anglo-American copyright tradition’s populist approach.”100 Although the
Nazis’ proposed copyright revisions did not stray far from the mainstream of prewar
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176-77. Nazi law enlisted state bureaucrats to police the integrity of creative works,
rather than leaving such decisions to the author; again emphasizing the collective, communal lens
through which they viewed the creative enterprise. See id. at 181.
96 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 174. German fascism differed from Italian fascism in that it was
extremely culturally conservative. Hitler declared all modernist art to be degenerate. Id. at 171.
And the Nazis were routinely “burning books and murdering and exiling authors” as well as
maintaining “official patronage and censorship.” Id. at 190. Nazi rhetoric celebrated a vision of
authorship that excluded many flesh-and-blood authors; they embraced “the creative personality—
as long as he was a good Nazi and an Aryan.” Id. at 196. The Nazis’ refusal to treat all authors
alike—by denying copyright protection to Jewish authors, for example—also revealed the hollowness
of their pro-author rhetoric. Id. at 214-15.
97 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 183-186.
98 Id. at 170-83. Film as an artistic medium posed a special challenge to German law, as it has
for many other authors’-rights countries. The Romantic movement’s celebration of individualistic,
personal creativity makes a poor fit with collective cultural endeavors such as film that depend upon
input from many creators. Furthermore, films are costly to create, and producers ordinarily require
exclusive rights in the finished product to justify their investments even if they themselves made no
creative contributions to the work. German law resolved the tension by recognizing the producer as
the holder of the copyright in the film but making her a trustee of the individuals who actually
exercised creative control over the work. See BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 187-91. Problems of this
sort pose fewer thorny issues in Anglo-American jurisdictions, which apply the work made for hire
rule to vest copyright ownership in the movie studio who contracted for the work to be created. See,
e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing studio as sole author of
film under work made for hire rule).
99 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 192-95.
100 Id. at 197.
94
95
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European thought, and their actual substantive law never matched their rhetoric,
their populist rhetoric alone proved unbearably toxic in the postwar years.
After the war, the European democracies competed to see who could most
ostentatiously disavow all the trappings of the fascist ideology, which had laid waste
to the Continent. Any policy that carried with it a hint of association with the Nazis
was doomed; instead, reformers strained to adopt the opposite policy. Baldwin’s
analysis, however, demonstrates the selective amnesia of postwar copyright
reformers; for their zealous embrace of authors’ moral rights had its closest parallel
in the successful efforts by the fascist government of Mussolini’s Italy to enshrine
strong moral rights protections in the Berne Convention during the Rome Conference
of 1928.
Despite these contradictions, embracing the cause of strong moral rights
protections served a number of needs for postwar European copyright reformers, of
which repudiating the terror of the Nazi era was only a part. Because moral rights
were strongly individualistic and rooted in a Romantic vision of heroic creators, they
also served to differentiate the nations of Western Europe from the faceless
collectivism of the Soviets whose puppet states now perched on their eastern
doorstep. Because moral rights were inalienable and perpetual, permitting authors
to exercise ongoing control over how their works were used, they simultaneously
served as a rebuke to the exploitative materialism and lowbrow coarseness of
American popular culture.101
The governing international agreements changed little at first. Rejecting
proposals to enshrine stronger protections for moral rights in international law, the
delegates to the 1948 Berne Conference in Brussels chose only to add a new resale
royalty or droit de suite right, and to lengthen the minimum term of copyright
protection to fifty years after the death of the author. 102 Further Berne revisions in
1967 and 1971 permitted (but did not require) perpetual protections for moral rights,
added a disclosure right, and required all Berne Union nations to provide adequate
moral rights protections during an author’s lifetime (with the thornier topic of
postmortem protections left to individual nations to resolve).103
Postwar France and Germany, however, shared none of the international
community’s hesitancy and incrementalism, instead racing to enact their own strong
moral rights laws. Even as they codified a century’s worth of developments in the
case law, French jurists insisted that their new statutes created no rights but merely
recognized those pre-existing and inalienable rights that nature itself bestowed upon
all authors.104 France’s 1957 moral rights statute divided authors’ “material”
interests (which were assignable and lasted for the full Berne term of fifty years
postmortem) from their “immaterial” rights, which were perpetual and inalienable.
After the author’s death, the law mandated that an author’s moral rights passed to
her heirs, who “were to follow—forever—the author’s presumed wishes” regarding
uses of the author’s works.105 “If the author’s assignees or heirs flagrantly abused
their powers,” the French government was empowered to step in to protect the
Id. at 200-02.
Id. at 202-03.
103 Id. at 203.
104 Id. at 204-05.
105 BALDWIN, supra note 6 at 206.
101
102
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deceased author’s reputation.106 And the law countenanced few exceptions to
authors’ rights for fair uses.107
In West Germany, copyright reformers dusted off failed authors’ rights proposals
advanced during both the Weimar era and the Third Reich, which they now updated
“to fit the postwar spirit, focusing on authors and ignoring the audience.”108 The
result was the new German copyright law of 1965, which required strong protections
for the author’s attribution, disclosure, integrity rights, and created new rights of
withdrawal or repenting along with a resale royalty or droit de suite right. Although
these rights lasted only as long as the copyright in the author’s work (and thus were
not, as in France, perpetual), they were inseparable from the author herself—the
moral rights could not be assigned or inherited. Unlike both the Nazis and the
French, postwar Germany gave state authorities no role in protecting authors’
reputations. Most important of all, the 1965 German law adopted a copyright term of
70 years after the death of the author—an even longer term than Berne required.
This would come to define the global gold standard of protection in decades to
come.109
This further strengthening of authors’ rights in France and Germany left the
gap between Continental and Anglo-American copyright laws wider than ever. The
United States remained defiantly outside the Berne Union, although American
publishers were beginning to push more strongly for the nation to join the
international copyright system. Others resisted calls for the United States to adhere
to international standards, noting the risks strong copyright protection posed to
research and the dissemination of knowledge, while still others simply rejected any
suggestion that the United States should become even a little bit more like France. 110
The work made for hire rule, as much a settled part of the American legal tradition
as the integrity right in Continental Europe, was also thought to be in jeopardy if the
United States joined Berne.111 “When American authors and their allied publishers
smugly portrayed the Berne Union as the quintessence of advanced thought,”
Baldwin writes, “they were easy prey for skeptics.”112
After drifting very far apart by the 1960s, the Continental and Anglo-American
systems began moving back together—slowly at first, then with increasing speed in
the final decades of the twentieth century. Some of the movement came from
Europe, which came to accept the traditional Anglo-American work made for hire

106 Id. at 207. Further showing the impossibility of dividing moral rights protections from the
legacy of fascism that reformers were seeking to repudiate, French law on this point gave the state
essentially the same responsibilities that the Nazis did. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
107 Id. at 208.
108 Id. at 209.
109 Id. at 209-13, 247.
On the Berne Convention’s creation of pressure for ever-stronger
copyright protections, see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
110 Id. at 214.
111 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 217-18.
112 Id. at 215. Existing United States law also fitted well with American economic needs. The
domestic manufacturing requirement that had been a condition of American recognition of foreign
copyrights since 1891 provided jobs for American workers, and industries that depended on
aggregating multiple creators’ contributions, such as the film industry, remained hostile to the
principle that each creator enjoyed strong and inalienable rights under principles of natural law.
Id. at 214-17; cf. supra note 71.
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rule for works, such as software and film, whose production required coordinating the
efforts of multiple contributors.113
By far the greatest legal change, however, came from the United States, which
within a few decades transformed itself from a skeptic to a true believer, and indeed
became the world’s foremost international copyright evangelist. Berne proponents,
long marginalized, came to dominate policymaking in the United States. Their
influence is easily seen in the landmark U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 114 which took
many significant steps toward Berne compliance, each of which tended to increase
copyright protection and correspondingly to diminish the public domain. The 1976
Act lengthened U.S. copyright terms from a maximum of 56 years to fifty years after
the death of the author (precisely the term, then and now, mandated by Berne), and
eliminated the former requirement that only published works were eligible for
federal copyright protection. The 1976 Act did not eliminate formal requirements
such as notice and deposit of copies with the Library of Congress, but it did permit
deficient formalities to be cured during a specified period following publication of the
work.115
Continental-style moral rights protections, however, remained a harder sell;
they fitted poorly with the prevailing conception of copyright in the United States as
an economic tool to induce creative production. The disclosure right stood on fairly
firm ground; unauthorized disclosure of an author’s work would likely constitute
copyright infringement. But the other moral rights found protection only by analogy
to other legal doctrines in Anglo-American law. Authors’ integrity interests received
some protection through the expansion of copyright’s derivative works right, and they
could reserve what amounted to an attribution right via contract; but the right of
repenting was largely ignored (although, to be fair, even many European nations
recognized no such right).116
Yet the introduction of Continental thinking into Anglo-American copyright
ideology, coupled with the economic imperative of serving the sizable European
market, eventually led even the traditionally skeptical Anglophone nations to enact
stronger moral rights protections. Britain did so in 1988, although this was done
without much enthusiasm; Britain’s historic commitment to do as little as possible to

Id. at 220-25, 315-16.
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
115 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 219. Baldwin recognizes that while the 1976 Act took some steps
that moved U.S. law further away from full Berne compliance, these steps were relatively minor
compared with the generally pro-Berne direction of the legislation. The 1976 Act, for example,
eliminated perpetual common-law copyright protection for unpublished works, instead supplying
federal protection upon fixation of the work and preempting the state copyright laws which would
otherwise have governed. Id. at 220; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (fixation); 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
(preemption) (2012). Similarly, the fair use principle (disfavored in Continental jurisprudence) was
expanded in the 1976 Act through extension to unpublished works—first implicitly, then later
explicitly through a statutory amendment made to overturn an unfavorable Supreme Court
construction of the original language. Compare Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 550-54 (1985) (reasoning that scope of fair use protection is narrower with respect to
unpublished works), with Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107)
(clarifying that courts are to apply same standards to evaluating fair uses of both published and
unpublished works). See also BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 220.
116 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 225-30.
113
114
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implement its Berne Convention obligations remained resolute. 117 In the United
States, state-level protections for moral rights were followed by a federal statute in
1990, which for the first time recognized the attribution and integrity rights, but only
for some expressive works.118
In the late twentieth century, the rising importance of intellectual property
exports in the American economy led the United States to consider a move that past
generations would have seen as heresy: to wit, full membership in the Berne Union.
American policy, which had accommodated itself to the interests of United States
publishers for most of the nation’s history—first by avoiding any legal commitments
that would have inhibited the free reproduction of foreign works, then by mandating
that foreign works be printed in the United States in order to receive copyright
protection here—now accommodated itself again to the interests of American media
companies by demanding greater protections for American works overseas.
American publishers came to see the Berne Convention’s requirement of strong
rights and lengthy terms as advantages rather than detriments. Adherence to Berne
also served the United States’ interest in ongoing negotiations with trading partners,
who had resisted American demands for stronger copyright protections by noting
that the United States itself remained outside the international copyright system.
The United States finally became a member of the Berne Union in 1989, 119 making
several conforming changes to its laws that, individually and in the aggregate,
tended to privilege authors and publishers at the expense of the public domain. 120
Although the Berne Convention itself called for a minimum copyright term of
fifty years after the author’s death, the underlying natural-rights logic on which it
rested supported perpetual rights: if rights in real property, for example, could
endure forever, why should the same not be true of intangible property? France had
already adopted perpetual protections for moral rights, and Germany had lengthened
its copyright term well beyond the Berne minimum. 121 Adherence to the Berne
Convention in the United States brought increased pressures—mostly from the
publishers who stood directly to benefit—to lengthen copyright terms still further.122
Baldwin finds unimpressive the economic rationale for longer copyright terms.
He writes:
As late as the early twentieth century, before the lockstep assumption
that longer terms demonstrated progress and enlightenment, it was
still argued that the higher the average educational level, the shorter
terms should be.123

117 Id. at 230-35; see also id. at 234 (“At best Britain thus instituted the bare minimum of
Berne’s moral rights.”).
118 Id. at 235-36, 239-40; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
119 See supra note 81 and accompanying text; BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 256 (“The Americans
were hoisted by their own petard. Seeking strong international protection for intellectual property,
they could not neglect at home what they demanded abroad.”); id. at 278 (noting that joining Berne
Union gave the U.S. credibility to demand stronger protections from other nations).
120 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 256-60.
121 See supra notes 105, 109 and accompanying text.
122 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 241.
123 Id. at 242.
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The logic was that a more literate public would naturally demand more books,
leading to increased sales and decreasing the amount of time authors would require
to recoup the full value of the investment they had made in producing the work.
Lengthening the copyright term had the effect of increasing the period during which
rights holders could extract additional rents for works already in existence, but
proponents offered no persuasive evidence that longer terms would lead to the
production of additional works in the future. To the contrary, significant effects on
future expressive output would be unlikely given how little the additional future
revenue stream would be worth when discounted to present value. Lengthening
terms also gave authors’ future heirs an effective veto over cultural development. 124
Despite these considerations, copyright terms again lengthened in the 1990s,
with most developed nations matching the life-plus-70-year term that Germany had
adopted in 1965. The European Union mandated life-plus-70 for all European
nations in 1993, and the United States followed suit in the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998. 125 When it came to term extension, “American authors
and disseminators saw eye to eye—the public be damned.”126
Term extension was politically uncontroversial in Europe, but the Sonny Bono
Act was a step too far for supporters of copyright’s “traditional concern with the
public domain” in the United States.127 The result was the lawsuit that eventually
reached the Supreme Court as Eldred v. Ashcroft.128 The Court’s rejection of Eldred’s
constitutional challenge to the Sonny Bono Act was effectively foreordained, Baldwin
writes, from the moment the United States committed itself to joining the Berne
Union. For most of the United States’ history, copyright had been justified not as
primarily concerned with private property but with the public good. Authors were
entitled to only such rewards as were necessary to induce them to create, and no
more. Berne, however, changed the equation: “the public good grew less important.
Europe’s property-dominated rhetoric crept in, and the very logic of encouraging
authorial creativity subtly shifted.”129 The logic of authors’ rights underlying the
Berne Convention suggested that authors could never be rewarded too richly for
exercising their creative faculties: if a little reward was good, more was always
better. “In other works, the more reward, the more good. This was a long way from
the enlightened—and socially efficient—vision of the founding fathers.”130 In Eldred,
the Supreme Court began to abandon the principle that incentives should be limited
to the minimum necessary to induce authorial creation, and to treat copyright much
more as an inherent natural property right for authors; notions anathema to preBerne United States copyright jurisprudence, but long accepted in Europe. 131
Id. at 242-43.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 247-48. Baldwin traces the Europeans’ fondness for the life-plus70 rule not only to the demands of authors for ever-greater protection, but also to the principle that
the state should provide for the needs of authors’ heirs for two generations—a vestige of Europe’s
historically greater emphasis on “families, lineages, and inheritances” as compared with American
rhetoric of upward mobility and self-reliance. Id. at 255. Regardless, the policy consequences on
both sides of the Atlantic were the same.
126 Id. at 248.
127 Id. at 248.
128 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
129 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 250.
130 Id. at 251.
131 Id. at 251-52.
124
125
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“[F]rom the 1990s on, European-style property rhetoric sounded more often in
America.”132
Term extension, and the other legal changes that the United States made to
bring its laws into conformity with the Berne Convention’s requirements, all tell a
different story for Baldwin than the conventional narrative suggests. He writes:
Copyright’s evolution is often told as a story of American cultural
hegemony. In fact, the opposite is more plausible. True, moral rights
were only partly taken on board in the Anglophone nations. But in
other, more important respects, the Continental approach triumphed:
the abolition of formalities, the extension of terms, and most
fundamentally, the shift of copyright’s philosophical underpinnings
from statute back toward natural rights. Authors were now to be
rewarded as deserving property owners, not incentivized for reasons
of social utility.133
Having internalized the tenets of authors’-rights ideology, the United States set
about exporting them. In the 1990s, in a series of multilateral trade agreements, the
United States successfully insisted that foreign nations bring their copyright laws up
to the standards America had recently embraced. In 1994, the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (more commonly known as
TRIPS) required stronger intellectual property protections overseas as a price of freer
access to the U.S. market, and the two WIPO internet treaties of 1996 added new
regulations of digital technologies on top of expanded copyright rules. 134 All these
international agreements fitted a common pattern: in each case, they required
smaller, less developed countries (who tended to be net importers of copyrighted
works) to adopt the high standards of copyright protection that had (very recently, in
the case of the United States) come to prevail among developed nations. As Baldwin
writes, “[t]he international trade treaties of the 1990s . . . subjected most countries to
the strict standards of the First World and deprived the not-yet-industrialized
economies of a means to modernize that Europe, the United States, and later much of
Asia had already exploited.”135 As already noted, the United States had grown its
domestic publishing industry, among others, through the purposeful disregard of
other nations’ intellectual property rights.136 Now, however, it moved to block
smaller nations from following the same path to prosperity. By integrating
requirements for strong intellectual property protections into WTO trading rules, the
TRIPS agreement gave developed countries a new mechanism to compel compliance
by smaller countries: now, smaller countries risked jeopardizing their access to the

Id. at 253.
Id. at 260-61; see also id. at 303 (“The now dominant First World consensus held that works
were property and deserved thick protection. This position was more of a change for the Americans
(and to a lesser extent for the British) than for the Continentals.”).
134 Id. at 264.
135 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 275.
136 See supra note 69 and accompanying text; BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 276.
132
133
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United States and other large world markets if they failed to strengthen intellectual
property protections sufficiently.137
In the 1996 WIPO treaties, the United States again demanded new protections
from its trading partners, this time to protect technological measures employed to
protect works published in digital form against circumvention. The 1994 White
Paper that the Clinton Administration produced expressly adopted a European,
author-centric approach to international copyright: it “explicitly rejected the
nineteenth-century belief that the public good lay in cheap and widespread access to
works . . . Copyright protection should instead be bolstered to stimulate high-quality
content.”138 And in a sign of how far the Administration wished to move the law
towards requiring compensation even for educational uses, “libraries were told to
expect curtailment of the very base of their lending, the first sale principle. Instead,
they should explore institutional licenses, with fees per reader.”139 Even some
European nations balked at the wholesale abandonment of any concern for the public
interest that the Clinton Administration championed, and the WIPO treaties
ultimately did not go as far as U.S. negotiators wished. Nevertheless, the 1996
treaties reflected “the emergent, Berne-based, Euro-American consensus that
intellectual property was much like conventional property, that owners deserved
strong protection, and that exceptions to exclusive authorial rights should be strictly
limited.”140
The internationalization of America’s newfound love of copyright is one of the
two major themes explored in the last third of Baldwin’s book. The other is the
digital revolution, which created both new problems and (as is often overlooked) new
opportunities for content creators and brought new interested parties into copyright’s
ever-widening debate. Baldwin writes that, at least in the United States, “[o]pen
access activists, who had battled the content industries unaided at first, gradually
discovered a pleasant coincidence of interests with the internet and high tech
sectors.”141 For the first time in decades, the digital era supplied a countervailing
force to offset the content industries’ push for ever-stronger copyright protection. But
while the advent of the internet and the era of mass digitization have “changed
everything,” in Baldwin’s words, they have not changed the actual policies pursued
by developed nations, which remain committed to a Berne-driven expansion of
copyright and opposed to legal changes that would legitimize uses of the internet that
the content industries disfavor. As Baldwin writes, “[r]ather than exploring
licensing, allowing untrammeled access tempered by statutory royalties, or other
137 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 278 (“Access to the United States—on most metrics still the
world’s largest market—was the quid offered in return for a quo of strict protection for American
products abroad.”); see also HAGGART, supra note 1, at 69 (“Now-‘developed’ countries like the
United States may have industrialized through the free appropriation of other countries’
‘intellectual property,’ but TRIPS makes it impossible for today’s developing countries to take the
same path.”).
138 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 280.
139 Id. at 280. Although the White Paper was simply an aspirational policy statement and not a
regulation with the force of law, the views it expressed have become the law in some instances. See,
e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting argument
that copyright’s first sale doctrine permits transfer of digital work from one owner to another).
140 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 282. On the ways in which the final text of the two 1996 WIPO
treaties deviated from American negotiating demands, see Baldwin, pp. 282–83.
141 Id. at 264.
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legal novelties, the US and the EU have dragged the Berne template of exclusive
authorial property rights awkwardly into the digital age.”142 Indeed, even principles
regarded as fairly well settled in the offline space, such as the first sale rule and
private copying for personal use, have been limited in the digital world—a
consequence of content providers’ ceaseless demands for ever-stronger protection.143
Philosophical support for a reconsideration of copyright rights also arrived in the
late twentieth century with the rise of the postmodernist aesthetic. Postmodernism
savagely critiqued the Romantic image of authorship that lay at the heart of the
Berne Union’s ideology, of noble creators laboring in solitude to express their
personal genius to the benighted masses. To the contrary, the postmodernists
maintained, authorship was an inherently social process involving recombining and
repurposing existing cultural artifacts, with every generation retelling stories and
reusing ideas that came before. Every author was “the product of his society and
age . . . who created using other authors’ materials.”144 Works themselves were
cultural artifacts whose meaning “hinge[d] as much on how it was received,
understood, and reused by others as on the author’s intentions—however those might
be interpreted.”145 These new understandings challenged the authors’-rights
philosophy that had barely begun to root itself in United States law: if works are
inherently collective exercises that rest upon a chain of cultural antecedents
extending endlessly into the past, their meaning culturally determined and always
contingent, then what can core moral rights notions such as “attribution” and
“integrity” possibly mean? How can a right of withdrawal coexist with the
indestructibility of information that the Internet was engineered to ensure? The
combination of the digital revolution and the postmodernist rethinking of the nature
of authorship posed questions that Continental authors’-rights philosophy remains
hardly able even to discuss, much less to answer.146
The two sets of legal and technological developments sketched out above—
America’s growing international insistence on strong protections, reflected in the
1994 TRIPS agreement and the 1996 WIPO internet treaties, as well as the new
challenges posed by the explosive popularity of digital media and the Internet—
finally collided with the passage in the United States of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998.147 Ostensibly written to implement the requirements of the
1996 WIPO treaties in U.S. law, the DMCA actually went well beyond what those
treaties required.148 The DMCA, however, broke even more new ground than
Baldwin acknowledges. What is actually described in THE COPYRIGHT WARS is
something of an idealized vision of what the DMCA was meant to do, in the words of
its proponents. The book’s seeming acceptance at face value of assurances offered at
the time the bill was enacted, even those that events have since revealed as baseless,
Id. at 265.
Id. at 267-68.
144 Id. at 270; see also, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966,
1007-12 (1990) (“the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea”).
145 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 270.
146 Id. at 269-73.
147 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
148 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 283.
142
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may lead informed readers to come away from this portion of the book unsatisfied.
There are no major blunders to be found, but a set of curious omissions and
misplaced emphases nevertheless detract from the overall discussion; a flaw shared
in some measure even by Haggart’s generally more skeptical account of the same
events.149
As Baldwin tells it, the DMCA as originally introduced in Congress was severely
overbroad; the draft bill “initially forbade any unauthorized use of protected works,
including fair use.”150
Legislative concern that “[i]ndiscriminate protective
technologies might block even lawful access,” however, led Congress to add new
protections to the bill: it clarified that circumvention for the purpose of making a
copy of the work was governed by ordinary copyright law (including, presumably, fair
use and other defenses), and made a “[s]eries of compromises” that ultimately yielded
“a moderated version of the maximalist agenda that the Clinton Administration had
originally taken to [WIPO].”151 The extent to which subsequent court decisions have
undone this “moderation” of the legislation and restored a meaning far closer to its
original, extreme form receive a mention that seems quite cursory in proportion to its
importance.152
For Baldwin, the interesting part of the story of the DMCA is what it reveals
about the long-standing political and economic power of the copyright industries and
the rising strength of technology suppliers and Internet communications companies.
The final version of the DMCA gave content suppliers one thing they wanted—legal
rules prohibiting the use of or trafficking in devices that would circumvent
technological measures protecting their works—but simultaneously took away
something else from them, namely, the right to sue online service providers whose
users posted infringing content (or search engines that helped such content to be
located once posted).153 By “open[ing] a large loophole in rights holders’ hopes of
controlling works on the web,” the DMCA presaged “the coming power of the internet
industrial complex that would burst into public view fifteen years later.”154
Copyright thus became part of an intra-state “civil war in California,” pitting
Hollywood against Silicon Valley.155 The DMCA gave both sides of the “civil war”
something to cheer: “Did big media win as the DMCA imposed stringent anticircumvention provisions on the use of content? Or did the software, electronics, and
Internet industries get their way with generous safe-harbor provisions, permitting
them to transmit content without policing infringement?”156
See infra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 283; see also id. at 284-85 (“[t]he Judiciary Committee’s version
had flatly prohibited all circumventing of technological protection”).
151 Id. at 286.
152 Id. at 287.
153 Id. at 286.
154 Id. at 287.
155 Id. at 291-95.
156 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 294. This framing constrains the discussion in ways that Baldwin
appears not to recognize, however. If it is too soon to declare a winner in California’s copyright civil
war as Baldwin suggests, it is surely not too soon to declare ordinary consumers and the public
interest to be the losers. So completely has the authors’-rights philosophy displaced concern with
the public good, leaving only the competing property interests of this or that industry group,
apparently, that the notion that citizens not part of either industry nevertheless have a stake in
copyright policy passes all but unnoticed in the discussion.
149
150
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Soon—in what Baldwin somewhat oddly portrays as a move of calculated
opportunism—technology companies began to echo public interest advocates’ calls for
“open access and free-flowing information.”157 Their calls to rein in copyright
restrictions were roundly rejected by the courts, which shut down the popular
Napster file-sharing service, then the decentralized peer-to-peer software programs
that had arisen to replace it.158 When a pattern of court decisions almost entirely
favorable to the content industries failed to improve their economic fortunes, the
content industries turned to litigation against their own would-be customers, filing
thousands of lawsuits against “downloading teenagers, college students, and single
mothers, not just large-scale pirates.”159 These efforts, whatever their legal impact,
were “dismal public relations failures,”160 and appear to have demonstrated only that
it is not possible to sue people into liking you: the music industry shrunk by 40
percent from 1999 to 2012 before beginning a slight rebound.161
Technology companies were not the only new voices to oppose the constant
expansion of copyright rights as the twentieth century drew to a close. Although
they had taken comparatively marginal roles in prior debates, by “the late twentieth
century, libraries, colleges, and research institutions had also become major players”
in the setting of copyright policy.162 Furthermore, as Baldwin writes:
Beyond libraries and universities lay the grassroots open access
movement—a wildfire of popular opposition, nourished by belief in
the common good, defiant of the ideology of intellectual property,
spread via the web, and whipped to combustion by the copyright
industries’ overreaching claims.163
Changing policy, however, proved more difficult.
Although proposals were
periodically introduced in Congress to narrow the DMCA or to protect users of socalled “orphan” works (works whose current copyright owners could not be
identified), none was enacted.164
Europe greeted the digital era differently. The fact that Europe already had
well-developed cultural industries and very high levels of copyright protection meant
Id. at 293.
Id. at 295; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
159 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 308.
160 Id. at 292; see also HAGGART, supra note 1, at 65 (recording industry’s litigation campaign
against file-sharing was “largely a public-relations disaster” that “led more and more people to
become interested and involved in copyright policymaking.”).
161 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 295. Other copyright-dependent industries have fared slightly
better, with commercial publishing, newspapers, and film seeing less harm from file-sharing than
the music industry; and still other industries, including gaming and scientific publishing, have
profited in the digital era. Id. at 295-96.
162 Id. at 297-98.
163 Id. at 298.
164 Id. at 299-300. The first substantive amendment to the DMCA was enacted too late to be
mentioned in Baldwin’s book, and was much narrower and more technical in scope than the
unsuccessful proposed reforms Baldwin discusses. See Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless
Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113-144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014) (codifying DMCA exemption previously
issued by Librarian of Congress permitting consumers to “unlock” mobile wireless devices for use on
wireless networks other than the network operated by the seller of the device).
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that its laws and institutions underwent fewer wrenching changes in the late
twentieth century than did the United States. 165 Europe adopted a life-plus-70
copyright term in 1993 with none of the controversy that surrounded the Sonny Bono
Act in the United States five years later (and, after all, life-plus-70 had been the law
in Germany for nearly thirty years before becoming the European standard). 166 But
while the advent of the Internet and the influence of the postmodernist movement
prompted an ongoing reassessment of the value of traditional copyright principles in
the United States, Europe remained committed to the same vision of strong authorial
rights that had animated Continental policy since the 1800s. 167 Europe’s
implementation of the 1996 WIPO internet treaties largely mirrored the U.S. DMCA
(while omitting the DMCA’s safe harbor protections for technology providers whose
users infringed) and gave even less consideration to the question whether
anticircumvention rules would curtail users’ rights.168
D. Copyright in the Digital Millennium
The Internet revolution sparked an unusual copyright rebellion that began in
the United States and gradually spread overseas.
Proponents of copyright’s
traditional concern with the public domain and access to knowledge, who had found
themselves on the losing end of nearly every public policy battle since the United
States began moving toward Berne Union membership in the Copyright Act of 1976,
gained new allies and even began winning occasional battles in the early twenty-first
century. As Baldwin recognizes, what makes this battle so unusual is that its
“reform” wing is, in desired outcome if not in partisan orientation, conservative;
today’s copyright reformers seek to restore the core concern with the public good that
animated copyright law for most of United States history and to return the law to its
original purpose.169 Moreover, the role of digitization is itself a contested issue in the
new millennium, with some arguing that the existence of a seamless, nearly cost-free
global distribution platform shatters copyright’s assumptions about the need to
provide financial incentives for publishers to disseminate expressive works, and
others responding that the true genius of the internet lies in its capacity to erect
billions of tiny tollbooths where every use of every work can be individually licensed
and their authors paid.170
Baldwin’s thesis, explored in some depth in Chapter 8, is that we have seen all
of these debates before. The “millennial, sometimes apocalyptic, tenor of today’s
discussion” belies the fact that every change in the social or technological conditions
165 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 302, 303 (“The Europeans had already largely instituted what the
United States now sought to emulate.”).
166 Id. at 248, 304.
167 Id. at 305-06; see also id. at 306 (“Europe bravely reaffirmed inherited aesthetic certainties
just as digitality, leaching away authorial integrity and coherence, blurred the line between creator
and audience.”).
168 Id. at 307-13.
169 Id. at 299; see also id. at 326 (noting that, before reversing in the 1990s, “[t]raditionally,
American priorities favored the public domain, not authors.”). Copyright as a political issue cuts
across the left–right spectrum to which American political observers are accustomed. See id. at 396.
170 Id. at 318.
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of access to expressive works “has provoked grumbling from cultural conservatives,
fearful lest the masses use their newfound enlightenment for their own purposes—as
well as overjoyed optimism from reformers, delighted at similar prospects.”171
Generations past have faced their own problems of information overload, their own
debates over whether authors’ core interests lie in greater financial reward or greater
mass exposure of their works, and their own disagreements about whether the
audience’s own interests (and their occasional collaboration in the creation of
expressive works) stand on equal footing with those of traditional creators. All those
debates, in Baldwin’s view, are simply being reworked and recombined in the modern
era, much as the postmodernist aesthetic portrays authorship itself as an exercise in
remixing cultural antecedents.172
The contemporary era, however, has introduced new variations on the old
themes. Now, the notion of authorship as a collaborative, social process is no longer
just an abstract literary critique of the Romantic vision that underlies the Berne
Convention; real-world examples abound of group-produced works that use the
Internet to aggregate the efforts of far-flung contributors around the globe. “The
audience does not just consume culture but creates it too,” and “[c]onsumer and
author seem to meld.”173
So far, however, these changes in the world have had little visible impact on the
law. The United States remains wedded to strong protections for authors’ rights
which, not coincidentally, redound to the nation’s competitive advantage in
international trade. “In legal terms, the rights holders’ position in the digital age
remained broadly what it had been since the eighteenth century.”174 What has
changed, in Baldwin’s view, is that consumers, the technology and internet
industries, and a cadre of supporting academics have mobilized to defend a
traditional vision of copyright in the new millennium: “[t]he content industries’
extreme position was met by the audience’s equally uncompromising insistence that
digitality had changed the rules.”175
Given that Baldwin seems to have some sympathy with those combating the
overreach of the content industries—activists who can plausibly claim intellectual
kinship with such figures as Baron Macaulay and Daniel Webster—his descriptions
of them seem surprisingly pejorative.
The “grassroots movement” that has
“organiz[ed] to defend the public domain,” in his view, consists of “[d]igital
anarchists,” “[d]igital guerrillas,” “pirates, thieves, [and] civil disobedients.”176 Some
of this colorful rhetoric is surely supplied to enliven the potentially dry subject of
peer-to-peer file-sharing. But content-industry lobbyists pressuring Congress to pass
ever-stricter protections for copyright holders could scarcely have crafted a less
nuanced rhetorical bogeyman. Similarly, Baldwin’s assertions that social norms
(especially among the young) that favor file-sharing have actually impeded
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 320.
Id. at 319-24.
173 Id. at 327, 328.
174 Id. at 330.
175 Id. at 331; see also id. at 332-36.
176 Id. at 334-36. In what was perhaps intended as a self-deprecating note, Baldwin expresses
particular disdain for the “salaried intelligentsia” whose advocacy on behalf of “the digital ideology”
came at no personal cost. Id. at 375; see also id. at 377 (“Independent authors were angered by their
salaried peers’ sellout to what they saw as the false idols of open access.”).
171
172
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enforcement of the law177 ring hollow in light of the nearly unblemished string of
victories the content industry has amassed in file-sharing litigation.178 That the
music industry continued to shrink despite one court after another working to shore
up its pre-internet business model would make an interesting subject for
examination, but the concerns of THE COPYRIGHT WARS appear to lie elsewhere.
Baldwin regains his footing when his attention turns to developments in Europe.
The more developed European nations remain firmly committed to an expansive view
of intellectual property. Europeans’ historical view of artistic creation as the noblest
of human endeavors, entitled to at least equal (if not greater) stature compared with
ordinary property, remained largely untouched by the digital revolution. The fact
that the largest and most visible technology providers in the internet era were
United States companies allowed Europeans to join a reflexive, perpetual
undercurrent of anti-Americanism to the cause of defending authorial privileges—
even though the primary beneficiaries of Europe’s strong copyright laws are
multinational media conglomerates mostly also based in the United States.
The debates over copyright that the technological era provoked in the United
States were slower to arrive in Europe. The EU directive enacted in 2001 to
implement the 1996 WIPO Internet treaties did not provoke anywhere near the same
level of controversy as the U.S. DMCA statute. As before, figures situated relatively
on the fringe of European political thought articulated arguments in favor of the
public interest in copyright. Baldwin writes that:
In the United States, many voices resisted thick protection: digital
anarchists, librarians, researchers, law professors, and Silicon
Valley’s magnates. But in Europe the main opposition was heard
from shrill and narrow, single-issue pirate parties that arose to fight
only this battle.179
The pirate parties’ public profiles rose considerably following a widely publicized lawenforcement raid on the popular Pirate Bay web site in Sweden in 2006. The
Swedish pirate party won 7% of the vote in Swedish parliamentary elections the
following year, and German pirate parties also began enjoying some electoral
successes.180
The pirate parties’ views alienated both the European political right, who “were
outraged at the pirates’ attempts to justify digital theft as a blow for the public
interest,” and the political left, who “remained very traditional in their high-culture,
print-based attitudes and their suspicion of mass media and pop culture as Trojan
horses for American vulgarity.”181 “Typically beholden to parties of the left and self177 See BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 336 (“democracies could not enforce laws that were broadly
out of tune with social mores”); id. at 337-38 (“During the nineteenth century Americans had found
it politically impossible to impose copyright on foreign books. Now it was becoming similarly
difficult to enforce old-fashioned strictures on the new digital cornucopia.”).
178 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013); Capitol Records, Inc. v. ThomasRasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
179 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 340; cf. supra note 62 and accompanying text.
180 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 340-42.
181 Id. at 342, 343.
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professedly eager to welcome new entrants in pursuit of egalitarianism and
democracy,” Baldwin notes dryly, “European intellectuals and artists of a certain age
nonetheless discovered that they did not actually favor free downloads.”182
Nevertheless, the notion that “culture and knowledge were public goods whose
value increased the more they were shared,”183 a wholly conventional viewpoint well
within the historic mainstream of intellectual property thought in the United States
and the United Kingdom, began to win some converts on the Continent as well.
“Received opinion gradually acknowledged that the Anglophone copyright tradition
did not just do the content industries’ bidding but also defended an expansive public
domain.”184 German and Dutch research institutes, a few German courts, and even
some younger French lawyers, began to articulate reasons for reining back authors’
rights, which had only expanded on the Continent for over two hundred years. 185
France appears to have struggled the most to adapt its laws and cultural
institutions to the realities of the technological era. France’s so-called DADVSI bill
in 2006 (Le Droit d’Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l’Information),
written to implement the EU’s 2001 copyright directive and the 1996 WIPO internet
treaties, would have criminalized peer-to-peer file-sharing and downloading even for
private use. In the face of unexpected parliamentary opposition (some of which
reflected simple Gallic resistance to anything that might benefit American media
corporations rather than a genuine regard for the public interest in copyright policy),
the government offered rhetorical improvements, moderating its penalty proposals
and paying at least lip service to the notion of “achieving a balance between internet
downloaders and authors.”186 France’s 2008 HADOPI law (Haute Autorité pour la
Diffusion des Œuvres et la Protection des droits d’auteur sur Internet), ratifying a
private agreement reached in 2007 among internet providers and content companies,
established an escalating range of penalties for file-sharing, culminating in accused
downloaders’ internet connections being cut off. A final tweak in 2009 incorporated
judicial oversight into this process. At each step, advocates for more user-friendly
legislation were ignored or defeated. Baldwin writes: “this cluster of laws (DADVSI,
HADOPI, and the final 2009 law) reaffirmed traditional French views. Digital age or
not, the author remained firmly in the saddle . . . The left’s hopes for an audiencefriendly approach with more open access and downloading at flat-rate fees went
nowhere.”187 Later, after warning that the Google Books digitization project would
marginalize French literature online by focusing on English-language works, the
French government and publishing industry worked together to guarantee precisely
this result by refusing to permit French works to be digitized. 188

Id. at 344.
Id. at 344.
184 Id. at 345-346.
185 Id. at 346-348.
186 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 348.
187 Id. at 357; see generally id. at 348-358. The French left, Baldwin notes, is itself divided; it
has attempted, so far without success, “to reconcile the nation’s traditional veneration of high
culture with the need to pay attention also to the common people’s cultural interests.” Id. at 398.
The same might well be said of the U.S. government, with the caveat that maximizing export
revenues, not promoting high culture, seems to be the paramount objective of U.S. copyright policy.
188 Id. at 359-65.
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The digital era introduced new tensions into Continental copyright policy. On
the one hand, advanced economies such as France and Germany resisted suggestions
that technological advance required rethinking their settled commitments to strong
authors’ rights.189 They saw the Internet as a particularly American invention
crafted to serve the needs of English-speaking consumers.190 On the other hand, the
nations of Eastern Europe, only recently admitted to membership in the EU, shared
little of their Western peers’ reflexive anti-Americanism. They instead embraced the
Internet’s democratizing, enlightening potential with great enthusiasm. “In the
former East slogans of free and universal access were proclaimed on blogs and
chanted in the streets.”191 Delegates from Eastern European nations led the attack
on the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a treaty which would
have “create[d] a new international regime for punishing counterfeiting and
piracy.”192 The EU Parliament rejected ACTA by a lopsided vote of 478-39 on July 4,
2012, following a long string of adverse recommendations by EU committees. Of the
small number of Parliamentary delegates voting in favor of the treaty, fully half were
French.193
On the whole, however, Baldwin concludes that we now live in the era of
“European hegemony” in copyright.194 The conventional view, which sees copyright
policy driven by the needs of American media interests, overlooks the fact that
“[a]uthors’ rights were but one policy where the Americans followed European
examples.”195 Patent law, bankruptcy law, and even the law of capital punishment,
all have come to bear identifiable European influences in the United States. 196
Copyright law in the United States has moved, in a strikingly brief period of time,
first to internalize the principles of the Berne Union that the United States had long
resisted, and then to insist that America’s trading partners adopt even higher levels
of protection. A delayed reaction is underway, however, driven in part by “many
American liberals and intellectuals [who] regarded such author-centrism as an
outmoded obeisance to elitism . . . out of sync with the digital age.”197 And in an
intellectual reaction to Berne’s insistence upon ever-stronger protections for
copyright holders based upon the one-way logic of natural rights,
the traditional view of copyright as a limited monopoly that—while
keeping authors happy—fundamentally serves the public interest has
returned as an aspiration. Rejuvenated in the United States, where
it never entirely died, it is now echoed among the pirate parties and
youthful downloaders of Western Europe and the digitally

Id. at 358.
Id. at 360-62.
191 Id. at 358.
192 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 358.
193 Id. at 358.
194 Id. at 378.
195 Id. at 379.
196 Id. at 379-80.
197 Id. at 378.
189
190

[15:698 2016]

Two Comparative Perspectives on
Copyright’s Past and Future in the Digital Age

735

aspirational citizens of the former East. The battle between author
and audience continues.198
III. THE EVOLUTION OF NORTH AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAWS SINCE 1996
Blayne Haggart’s COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
REFORM turns a skeptical eye toward the conventional belief that the United States
has become the dominant player in international copyright law and that the United
States’ policy choices (and, therefore, the world’s) are dictated in large measure by
the wishes of American media companies. Refuting that view would be a challenging
task indeed, for the United States has in fact acted repeatedly (and, in some
instances, expressly) to advance the interests of domestic content producers as
against the interests of both its foreign trading partners and, indeed, its own citizens.
Ultimately, Haggart is compelled to settle for a narrower, but still provocative,
thesis: that internal political and economic institutions and regional trade treaties
may give smaller countries surprising resources to resist U.S. pressure for everstronger copyright rights. Foreign public and private actors may effectively sand the
rough edges off United States demands and maintain a degree of autonomy in
copyright policy despite America’s undeniable political and economic might.
Haggart develops his theory by examining how the two WIPO Internet treaties
of 1996 were negotiated, and then how the treaties came to be implemented in
United States, Canadian, and Mexican law. The fact that Mexico has yet to enact
legislation specifically implementing the anti-circumvention requirements and safe
harbor provisions of the WIPO treaties poses less of a problem for Haggart’s analysis
than might first appear, for Mexico’s inaction in the face of U.S. pressure itself
illustrates Haggart’s point about smaller nations maintaining their own policy
autonomy.
In Haggart’s view, the 1996 WIPO treaties make suitable subjects for analysis
because they “set the terms of the global digital-copyright debate and established the
actors—some veteran players, others newly minted, all with strongly held views
about how copyright law should be reformed—who would drive copyright reform in
the twenty-first century.”199 To these advantages might be added one other: the
WIPO treaties represent the last serious attempt in international policymaking to
accommodate the needs and interests of nations who do not see eye-to-eye on
copyright issues. Since the WIPO treaties, the subsequent pattern—in evidence both
with regard to the ACTA treaty in 2012, and the just-concluded TPP agreement—has
been for negotiations to involve progressively smaller groups of like-minded nations
who support strong copyright rights. That efforts to include a broader cross-section
of the international community have largely stalled since the WIPO treaties has
ongoing consequences, however, for 1996 was an eternity ago in Internet time. The
digital copyright debate has, in many respects, moved on since WIPO, and the world
the WIPO treaties anticipated has already changed in ways that international
copyright agreements have yet to recognize.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 382.
HAGGART, supra note 1, at 5; see also id. at 18 (WIPO treaties supply “the normative
baseline for states considering how to reform their copyright laws in the digital age.”).
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The choice of Canada, Mexico, and the United States as the subjects for
Haggart’s examination both strengthens and hinders the analysis. The advantage is
that the nations of North America describe the copyright universe in microcosm:
North America “includes the global copyright superpower, a small developed country,
and a key developing country.”200 Relatedly, the three nations straddle the
conceptual divide between the “copyright” and “authors’ rights” perspectives that was
the subject of Baldwin’s analysis: Canada has largely retained copyright’s emphasis
on the public interest from its Commonwealth heritage, while Mexican law continues
to show the influence of the authors’-rights ideology that Spain historically shared
with its Continental European neighbors.201 The drawback is that it may be
exceedingly difficult to generalize from the North American example to draw
conclusions about other nations in light of the already tight economic integration
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). That is to say, Haggart’s thesis is that smaller countries
may be able to resist demands for stronger copyright protection from the United
States, but his illustrations of that point all involve countries over whom the United
States has ceded some of its bargaining power as a result of NAFTA. Whether his
conclusions may be extended to other nations less fortunately situated than Canada
and Mexico remains unclear.202
Haggart agrees with Baldwin that technological change makes contemporary
copyright debates look newer than they really are, while “below the flashy surface we
see the same story that has played out in American copyright law since its
inception.”203 Nevertheless, technological advance has altered that story in at least
one critical way by bringing ordinary members of the public into the debate (a
development Haggart welcomes far less grudgingly than Baldwin). No longer a
remote, dusty corner of the law of interest to only a handful of industry specialists,
copyright has come to regulate a broad and still-growing swath of everyday human
conduct due to the effects of digitization. 204 The result, in Haggart’s view, has been
an increasing activation of copyright as a political (if still largely not a partisan)
issue, a development which has occasionally caught unprepared policymakers offguard—as Canada’s government was when sudden public outrage swamped its first
proposed WIPO bill in 2007, and as the United States Congress was when the

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-11. And the United States, of course, has occupied both ends of the spectrum at
different times in its history.
202 Haggart articulates somewhat inconsistent positions on this point. He first suggests that
the tight economic linkages that both Canada and Mexico share with the United States might leave
countries less tightly bound to the U.S. even greater freedom to choose the copyright policies that
best suit their own interests. Id. at 11. Later, however, he recognizes that regional economic
integration deprives the United States of a powerful tool—namely, improved access to American
markets—to influence the copyright policies of its smaller trading partners, necessarily implying
that U.S. influence may be greater in those nations where it can continue to offer valuable trade
concessions in exchange for stronger IP protections. Id. at 245.
203 Id. at 100.
204 See id. at 65 (“what was originally a commercial law designed by lawyers for lawyers now
directly affects individuals in ways that would have been inconceivable even twenty years ago
because computers, which are now ubiquitous in society, work by making copies”); id. at 92 (“The
technological empowerment of the individual represents a fundamental challenge to copyright.”).
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“internet blackout” of January 18, 2012 scuttled the draft SOPA and PIPA
legislation.205
The first three chapters of COPYFIGHT provide an overview of Haggart’s
methodology and conclusions. Haggart’s study of how the WIPO internet treaties
were negotiated, and how they have come to be implemented (or not implemented) in
the nations of North America, rests upon over fifty interviews with “experts,
policymakers, and business and civil society representatives” in all three countries. 206
Chapter 2 describes the “historical-institutionalist” framework of analysis—
providing, for legal scholars, a welcome guide to how political scientists such as
Haggart approach the study of legal change. Chapter 3 provides a thorough overview
of copyright policy and recent history. The book then presents four distinct case
studies of recent developments in copyright law, one dealing with how the WIPO
internet treaties were negotiated (Chapter 4), then three studies of how those
treaties have, or have not, been implemented in the domestic laws of the United
States (Chapters 5-6), Canada (Chapter 7), and Mexico (Chapter 8).
Haggart’s historical-institutional analysis attempts to account in a rigorous way
for “the changes over time in the relationship among the ideas underpinning IP, the
actors involved in policymaking, and the institutions structuring their
interactions.”207 “Institutions,” in this sense, are not just organizations; rather,
“institutions” are enduring social constructs “created, sustained, and changed by
purposeful actors” who differ in their resources, knowledge, and influence. 208
Copyright itself is an institution. Importantly for Haggart’s analysis, institutions
inevitably have distributive consequences; they “always favour some groups and
policies over others.”209 Institutions affect, and are affected by, actors pursuing
differing interests; but actors differ, depending on their resources and information, in
their abilities to influence institutions. Institutions also have a sort of inertia that
may make them resistant to change and cause them to persist even after the social
conditions that brought them into being have dissipated. 210 Ideas can both support
existing institutional structures or lead to institutional change. The institution of
copyright rests upon particularly forceful ideas, yet is also vulnerable to forceful
critique. In Haggart’s words:
Copyright . . . is anchored in core Enlightenment ideas of property
and individuality: powerful ideas that are often deployed to defend
copyright as a policy. However, the positive idea of ownership is in
tension with the negative idea of copyright as “monopoly” . . . which
can be used by those who do not benefit from copyright law to
challenge it.211
Would-be countervailing ideas, in order to produce lasting institutional change,
must be “credible (fitting the dominant paradigm), effective (insofar as it promises a
See HAGGART, supra note 1, at 3, 184-91, 251-55; see also supra note 9.
Id. at 30-31.
207 Id. at 33-34.
208 Id. at 35.
209 Id. at 35.
210 Id. at 36-37.
211 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 38.
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reasonable solution to a decision-making problem), and legitimate (resonate with
public sentiment).”212 The power of an existing institution to constrain competing
ideas along these dimensions is referred to as “path dependence,” a concept Haggart
finds “incredibly useful in explaining how and why policies like copyright have
persisted, in some recognizable form, over several centuries.”213 The mere fact of
institutional persistence, however, may simply reflect the inertia of path dependence;
it does not itself demonstrate the institution’s “social utility or effectiveness.”214
Internal pressures within institutions and exogenous shocks from without may both
create opportunities for change. “[T]he history of copyright law,” Haggart writes, “is
often told in terms of exogenous shocks, specifically the ways that technological
change creates new interests and changes the relative position of existing ones.”215
One such exogenous shock occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, when copyright in the
United States was purposely re-conceptualized as a mechanism for promoting the
export of U.S. music and film, thereby regaining a measure of global economic
influence even as American manufacturing industries declined. Haggart writes:
[T]he link between trade and IP was the result of lobbying in the
1970s and 1980s by US IP leaders, who argued that maximizing
international IP protection would maintain US global economic
dominance at a time when this hegemony was being threatened by
the rising star of Japan, among others. There was nothing “natural”
or inevitable about this linkage, but once made, it exerted, and
continues to exert, a powerful hold on our conceptions of how to
address copyright and IP issues.216
Haggart then undertakes an examination of copyright as a tool of public policy,
placing its distributional consequences front and center: copyright law is a part of “an
ongoing battle among various business and social groups to expand copyright in some
cases and in the service of some interests, and to restrict it in others.”217 “All debates
over copyright involve actors attempting to emphasize either the need for greater
protection or the promotion of dissemination—the two fundamentally irreconcilable
objectives of copyright law.”218
Copyright law requires constant ideological
justification precisely because its actual effect—“constructing a scarcity” in
knowledge and information—seems detrimental on its face, especially when
measured against Enlightenment values.219 That is why compensating benefits are
often asserted to explain why copyright’s costs are worth paying: copyright protection
may limit our uses of creative works today, but in return we will receive more works
tomorrow than without it. Yet, three centuries of experience with copyright law has
failed to produce more than anecdotal support for this proposition; the most that can
be said, in Haggart’s view, is that “copyright’s effects on the production and
Id. at 39 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 39.
214 Id. at 41.
215 Id. at 44.
216 Id. at 46.
217 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 49.
218 Id. at 51.
219 Id. at 51 (internal quotations omitted; emphasis in original).
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dissemination of creative works are, at best, indeterminate, dependent on the
structure of the particular market in question.”220 That indeterminacy may have
been tolerable for most of copyright’s history, but has become less so in an era where
“digital technologies challenge the necessity of the business models and justifications
that have grown up around copyright.”221
Haggart then surveys the primary players on the copyright stage, focusing first
on the businesses that base their livelihoods from the buying and selling of
copyrighted works (such as the music, film, software, and traditional publishing
industries), their affiliated lobbying arms, and the government agencies that have
historically responded to their perceived needs. On the whole, the so-called “content
industries” business models are based not on the production of new expressive works,
but on controlling and monetizing copies of works already in existence. 222 That
orientation necessarily gives those industries a backwards-looking perspective; they
are more likely to perceive their interests as threatened rather than advanced by
technological change.223 And the present technological era may pose the biggest
challenge yet, for “[d]igitization threatens traditional content industries’ scarcitybased business model to a much greater extent than previous technological
advances.”224 The logic of the digital communications revolution undercuts the
rationale for creating property rights in expressive works in the first place, for “since
it now costs much less to create, reproduce, and distribute works, publishers should
therefore need fewer, not more, property rights to protect their investment.”225
Such are the risks for publishers. What of creators themselves? Pre-internet
content-industry business practices exploited creators for publishers’ benefit, but at
least offered creators “certainty.” The digital era replaces that certainty with an
opportunity, which many creators have successfully seized, to eliminate the
middleman and communicate directly with fans. The WIPO treaties that are the
focus of Haggart’s study, however, have relatively little to do with artistic creation as
such; they involve issues that are typically of far greater concern to disseminators of
copyrighted works.226
Although ordinary “citizens and consumers have historically been excluded from
the formulation of copyright policy . . . the early 2000s witnessed a growing
awareness within civil society of the importance of copyright policy.”227 Individuals
now have a direct stake in copyright policy due to technological change, which has
given ordinary citizens both the tools to create new works by remixing existing
content and a global publishing platform. Haggart writes: “This is the revolutionary
fact that lies at the heart of the content industries’ crisis . . . For the first time in

Id. at 53.
Id. at 53.
222 Id. at 59.
223 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 59 (discussing example of how composers and sheet-music
publishers sought to leverage copyright to control duplication of player-piano rolls in early twentieth
century).
224 Id. at 60.
225 Id. at 60 (internal quotations omitted).
226 Id. at 62-63.
227 Id. at 63-64.
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history, publishers and distributors are facing competition from their customers.”228
“This direct involvement of the public fundamentally changes the dynamics of
copyright negotiations.” Obviously it is impossible for “millions of individuals” to
participate individually in the process of setting rules that will directly govern their
conduct.229
Accordingly, consumers’ interests have come to be represented—
tolerably, if imperfectly—by proxy, through technology companies. The technology
sector’s general interest lies in maximizing the interoperability or functionality of its
products to make them appealing as many consumers as possible, avoiding copyright
rules that would limit suppliers’ ability to meet consumer demand.230
National governments’ stake in copyright policy tends to be driven by the
structure of their domestic copyright-sensitive industries and on whether the nation
is an importer or exporter of intellectual property. Nations at different levels of
development may have different preferences as to the value of protecting intellectual
property. For countries that are net exporters of intellectual property goods, raising
global levels of protection redound directly to the benefit of their balance of accounts.
Conversely, for countries that import more intellectual property goods than they
export, every increase in levels of protection leads directly to an outflow of national
wealth to IP-producing nations.231
The movement to internationalize copyright law, which was born with the Berne
Convention in the 19th century and accelerated rapidly in the last few decades of the
20th, brings new institutions into the picture. Two international bodies—the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO)—have vied for influence over global intellectual property standards. 232
WIPO, as a specialized agency of the United Nations, historically “promote[d] a
particular view of knowledge and intellectual property rights” that was “‘centrally
concerned with socialization.’”233 In the 1980s and 1990s, dissatisfaction with
WIPO’s broader social mandate led large copyright exporters, such as the United
States and the European Union, to turn instead to the WTO, which was more focused
on economic concerns. The developed nations’ “coordinated push” to raise global
levels of intellectual property protection resulted in the 1994 WTO TRIPS
Agreement, which now defines “the global ‘floor’ in intellectual property rights” to
which all WTO member nations must adhere.234 The 1996 WIPO Internet treaties
that are the focus of Haggart’s book represented an attempt by WIPO to reassert its
own relevance in the wake of TRIPS. 235
The United States’ push for stricter global copyright standards cannot, however,
be explained solely as an attempt to maximize the nation’s global competitive
advantage in world trade. This is so, Haggart explains, because higher levels of
copyright protection disserve industries that collectively contribute more to the
228 Id. at 65.
Haggart also blames the recording industry’s years-long litigation campaign
against end-users of peer-to-peer file-sharing software for raising the public profile of copyright
issues, not always to the recording industry’s benefit. See id.
229 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 66.
230 Id. at 67.
231 Id. at 69-71.
232 Id. at 72.
233 Id. at 74.
234 Id. at 74, 82-84.
235 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 74.
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nation’s economy than do the publishing and recorded entertainment industries.
Thus, although United States content companies in the 1980s “successfully linked
American concerns about the potential loss of American economic predominance to a
push for stronger IP protection,”236 the legal structure that emerged from those
efforts sacrifices newer, growing industries to serve older, shrinking ones. In
Haggart’s words:
Absent political lobbying—the crucial factor determining US
government support for stronger copyright—the content industries’
contribution to the US bottom line may not be enough to justify the
one-sided pursuit of an agenda (stronger copyright) that
disadvantages other American companies and interests—some of
which, like Google, may have more upside potential than legacy
media companies like Disney.237
Furthermore, the linking of U.S. demands for stronger intellectual property
protections to the nation’s perceived self-interest in global trade has led to an
outsized role for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in global copyright
policymaking.238
A. The White Paper and the WIPO Treaties
Haggart next describes how the United States government took a sharp turn
towards a maximalist view of copyright in the 1990s—a turn that began among
Executive Branch officials before becoming recognized in international treaties, and
which finally became the basis for the controversial DMCA statute. It makes sense
to begin the story with the United States’ view, Haggart believes, because the U.S.
influences outside actors in the copyright arena to a far greater degree than it is
influenced by them.239 Yet, despite its undeniable economic and political clout, the
United States found itself constrained in the setting of international copyright
standards in the WIPO Internet treaties.240
One highly consequential feature of United States copyright policymaking,
Haggart explains, has been the frequent, repeated use of negotiations among affected
groups to set policy. Haggart describes copyright policymaking as “a pragmatists’
game, involving trade-offs among various interest groups that have a seat at the
table.”241 Congress has taken a comparatively limited role, generally contenting
itself with validating and enacting language resulting from these inter-industry
Id. at 76.
Id. at 79.
238 Id. at 75-82.
239 See id. at 93 (“a country whose own policies are almost completely a function of domestic
ideas, institutions, and interests, rather than of regional or international institutions”).
240 Id. at 93 (“not all of WIPO’s rules were conducive to US desires”).
241 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 99; see also Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 861 (1987) (describing how statutory language of the
Copyright Act of 1976 “evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and
other parties with economic interests in the property rights the statute defines”).
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237

[15:698 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

742

negotiations.242 This practice has shaped substantive copyright law in the United
States (and, therefore, internationally) to a great degree. Haggart writes:
US copyright law reflects the interests and relative strength
(economic and political) of those who have been invited to the table.
Already established groups tend to have an advantage over upstarts,
specific interests (i.e., industries) generally outclass the overall
“public interest,” and every invited guest does better than the
wallflowers.243
The industries whose interests were most directly in play at the time of the 1996
WIPO Internet treaties included the content-producing industries (music, film,
publishing, software, and the like) that generally favored stronger protections; and
the newer technology, Internet, and telecommunications industries, who generally
favored freer dissemination of expressive works. 244 The interests of the public were
represented, if at all, only by proxy to the extent that the public happened to share
some interests in common with industry groups promoting freer dissemination.245
The story of the WIPO Internet treaties begins in 1993 in the United States. In
that year—just as Internet access was beginning to become widespread outside the
circle of educational, military, and government agencies where it had already taken
root—the Clinton Administration appointed a task force to study the new technology
and make policy recommendations. The so-called Information Infrastructure Task
Force’s Working Group on Intellectual Property, chaired by USPTO Commissioner
Bruce Lehman, responded by issuing a report in 1995 that has become known simply
as the “White Paper.” The White Paper offered “an overwhelming emphasis on
protecting the rights of copyright owners and reflected a vision of creative ‘works’ as
tradable products.”246 “Users’ rights were treated as residual.”247 The White Paper
defined copies of works briefly present in volatile computer RAM memory as
infringing and offered a series of copyright-maximalist policy recommendations,
including a recommendation that online service providers should be required to
police their users’ actions to avoid possible copyright infringement, and a
recommendation for the creation of a new right for copyright owners against
circumvention of technological measures deployed to protect their works.248
When the Clinton Administration proposed new legislation to implement the
White Paper’s recommendations, however, Congress balked. The Task Force’s
recommendations departed from the historic U.S. practice of negotiated copyright
policymaking and provoked opposition from excluded industry groups (as well as
from new public-interest organizations formed to resist the White Paper’s proposed
encroachments on user freedoms).249
HAGGART, supra note 1, at 99.
Id. at 100-01; see also id. at 103 (end-user interests “simply cannot compete with the content
industries’ lobbying budgets”).
244 Id. at 102-07.
245 Id. at 106-07.
246 Id. at 111-12.
247 Id. at 112; see also supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
248 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 112; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
249 Id. at 112-13.
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In response to the legislative stalemate, Commissioner Lehman and other
Executive Branch officials sought to create further pressure to support the adoption
of the White Paper’s policy recommendations. The venue they selected was WIPO:
backers of the White Paper’s policy proposals would use the White Paper as the basis
for a new international commitment on stronger digital copyright protection, then
return to Congress with a new argument that enacting the White Paper’s proposals
had become an international obligation of the United States. 250 They found in WIPO
a generally receptive partner as the organization worked to reassert its own
relevance following the landmark 1995 WTO TRIPS Agreement. And their efforts
were, in large measure, successful: the two WIPO Internet treaties of 1996 both
contained new provisions mandating legal rules against the circumvention of
technological protection measures protecting copyrighted works. 251
Nevertheless, the WIPO process, and the treaties it produced, departed from the
United States’ preferences in multiple respects. Achieving agreement on the
proposed treaty language required accommodating the interests of countries that did
not share the United States’ economic views or the Clinton Administration’s
philosophical embrace of copyright maximalism. 252 Resistance from other nations
forced the U.S. to retreat from its original proposed anti-circumvention provision,
which would have banned circumvention tools outright regardless of their effects on
traditional copyright interests. Instead, the negotiators settled on more flexible
language—such as requirements that nations provide “‘adequate legal protection and
effective legal remedies’”—that the treaties left undefined.253 The resulting language
was sufficiently vague to invite ongoing debate over what the WIPO Internet treaties
actually require.254
The United States also did not succeed before WIPO in establishing expansive
new liability rules for Internet providers as the White Paper had recommended. The
U.S. delegation was itself divided; American telecommunications interests strongly
opposed the entertainment industries’ push for expansive rules of secondary liability
for technology providers whose users infringed copyright. As a result, the final
treaties contained no provisions directly on point, with both the technology and
media industries’ concerns reflected in a pair of “agreed statements” accompanying
the treaty text.255
Haggart finds in the final agreed language of the treaties evidence that WIPO
“member states chose to defend the status quo, not to create a new regime,” and
notes that the treaty language “seems to go out of its way to link any new provisions
with existing treaty obligations.”256
Although it is true that the Clinton
Administration ultimately could not persuade its negotiating partners to accept the
Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 115-16, 127-28.
252 Id. at 117-18.
253 Id. at 120.
254 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 120-21, 127-28.
In Haggart’s view, the negotiating history
supports a minimalist understanding of nations’ obligations to provide legal protections against the
circumvention of technological measures, for language that would have clearly required stronger
forms of legal protection was rejected in favor of the comparatively vague requirements quoted
above. Id. at 121.
255 Id. at 122-24.
256 Id. at 125.
250
251
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maximalist recommendations enunciated in the White Paper, Haggart’s dismissive
view appears to sell the WIPO treaties short; for it is clear in retrospect that the new
treaties effectively ended the legislative resistance that had blocked implementation
of the White Paper’s recommendations the year before and led directly to the passage
of the DMCA statute in the United States.
B. WIPO-Plus: The United States’ Response
Haggart identifies three primary consequences for United States law due to the
adoption of the WIPO treaties. First and most directly, as intended by the
Administration, the treaties broke the back of legislative resistance to the adoption of
strong rules prohibiting the circumvention of technological protection measures
protecting copyrighted works. Indeed, although the Administration’s demands
(which continued to rest upon the 1994 White Paper) were moderated somewhat as
the treaty-implementing legislation progressed through Congress, the final outcome
was a set of statutory provisions that arguably went beyond what the treaties
required (“WIPO-plus”), both as to the new anti-circumvention rules and in the
creation of a notice-and-takedown system for online service providers. Second,
Haggart finds that the compromises needed to secure the assent of its negotiating
partners to the WIPO treaties soured the Executive Branch on WIPO as a forum for
international intellectual property negotiations, leading the U.S. to again seek a
friendlier venue for future talks (which it has done ever since by negotiating only
bilaterally or among a comparatively limited and hand-picked group of like-minded
trading partners). WIPO marked the end of the United States’ effort—and perhaps,
Haggart suggests, its ability—to gain support from nations whose interests in
intellectual property policy diverge in any significant degree from the U.S.’s own.
Finally, Haggart writes, the fact that the Clinton Administration abandoned any
pretense of impartial service to the public interest, instead acting before both WIPO
and Congress as a mouthpiece for the wishes of the content industries, led to
copyright becoming, seemingly for the first time, a political issue of significant
concern to the broader public. What had long been a comparatively technical field of
interest only to a handful of legal specialists came, in a very short span of time, to be
a controversial political issue, culminating in the public revolt against the thenpending SOPA and PIPA legislation in 2012.
With the new WIPO treaties in hand, the Clinton Administration returned to
Congress to continue pushing for the stronger copyright protections it had demanded
in the 1994 White Paper. The result, however, was a legislative compromise that
reflected (even as the White Paper had defied) the historical use of inter-industry
negotiations to set U.S. copyright policy.257 As with prior instances in which
Congress had effectively permitted the representatives of affected industries to set
policy, the result was “long, detailed, counterintuitive, kind to the status
quo, . . . hostile to potential new competitors, [and] overwhelmingly likely to
appropriate value for the benefit of major stakeholders at the expense of the public at
large.”258
257
258

See supra notes 241-243 and accompanying text.
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The compromise between competing industry groups that finally led to the
enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 involved the technology
and telecommunications industries on one side and the recorded entertainment and
media industries on the other. Technology companies accepted new rules limiting
circumvention technologies; in exchange, the content industries dropped their
objections to the technology companies’ efforts to obtain immunity from liability for
infringements committed by users of their services. Haggart writes that “[t]he
DMCA’s passage reflected both the process’s compromise/negotiation-based nature
and that the process is weighted in favor of those actors with the greatest economic
and political resources.”259 Thus, the powerful content industries got “much of what
they wanted” from the new statute, which drew directly from the Administration’s
1994 White Paper in setting the language of the new anti-circumvention and antitrafficking rules.260 Technology companies’ concerns about secondary liability were
partly satisfied by the addition of the statutory safe harbor provision insulating them
against direct and contributory (but arguably not vicarious) liability arising from
users’ infringing acts.261
Like Baldwin, however, Haggart articulates an understanding of the DMCA that
subsequent events have at least partly contradicted. His assertion that DMCA
critics’ fears that the new statute would chill innovation and research have not come
to pass because “the courts generally have interpreted the DMCA to require a ‘nexus’
between copyright infringement and circumvention”262 will come as a surprise to
informed readers.263 Haggart also uncritically quotes the assertion of a content-

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133. The fact that the DMCA drew from the provisions of the White Paper, not the
less stringent language that the United States was compelled to accept in the WIPO treaties,
underlies Haggart’s characterization of the statute as going “far beyond what the treaties required.”
Id. at 24.
261 Id. at 135 (notice-and-takedown system, now codified in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), “satisfied both
content owners and ISPs.”).
262 Id. at 136.
263 Cf., e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950-52 (9th Cir. 2010)
(expressly rejecting argument that DMCA violation requires proof of a “nexus” with copyright
infringement); MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Industrial, Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010)
(superseding panel’s own prior opinion, 612 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2010), and deleting the prior opinion’s
reference to a copyright nexus requirement); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,
458–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that statute would be unconstitutional if interpreted to
forbid noninfringing fair uses); Pamela Samuelson, DRM {and, or, vs.} the Law, COMM. ACM, Apr.
2003, at 41, 43 (noting copyright holders’ past attempts to suppress findings of academic researchers
on strength of encryption technologies); Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences:
Sixteen
Years
under
the
DMCA
3–12
(2014)
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/09/16/unintendedconsequences2014.pdf (recounting many similar
incidents) [hereafter Unintended Consequences]. To be sure, interpreting the DMCA to require some
connection with the rest of copyright law is by far the better reading, easily resolving thorny
interpretive difficulties that arise from treating the DMCA’s anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking
rules as sui generis. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 28–32
(2008). The Federal Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have articulated interpretations of the DMCA
that do require inquiry into whether a plaintiff’s copyright interests have been violated, at least
where the plaintiff’s use of the DMCA seems to impair competition in the marketing and sale of
durable goods. See id. 15-27. For better or worse (mostly worse), however, this understanding is not
yet shared by the majority of the appeals courts that have considered the DMCA (including the
259
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industry lawyer, whose clients naturally support a broad interpretation of the
statute’s liability rules and a narrow construction of its liability safe harbor
provisions, that “there haven’t been any catastrophes”—a contestable proposition.264
Regardless of whether U.S. law under the DMCA has become more moderate in
recent years, however, Haggart is surely correct that such moderation has not yet
come to characterize the nation’s dealings with its trading partners: in its external
relations, at least, the U.S. “continues to advocate a blanket prohibition on TPM
circumvention mirroring the original Lehman white paper and draft Internet
treaties.”265
Reviewing the DMCA’s overall effects, Haggart finds that the statute’s “record is
mixed.”266 The DMCA utterly failed to solve the problem of widespread copyright
infringement online that led to the statute’s enactment, and Haggart is skeptical that
the statute has in fact increased the amount of authorized content available online. 267
Haggart also finds a subtler, potentially insidious long-term effect insofar as the
DMCA legitimizes the viewpoint that only rights holders’ interests, not users’, matter
in the setting of copyright policy. He writes:
The acceptance of the legal protection of TPMs and the legitimization
of the position that copyright owners have the right to control access
to the use of copyrighted works has potential to be an “evolutionary”
change in copyright that moves it closer towards being exclusively a
right that recognizes only the interests of copyright owners. 268
Haggart finds a second consequence of the WIPO Internet treaties in how the WIPO
experience altered the United States’ government’s subsequent negotiating strategy.
Getting the WIPO treaties adopted required the United States to make concessions
from the preferred policies it had enunciated in the White Paper. 269 Just as the
United States had previously changed the negotiating venue from WTO to WIPO, its
search for a more favorable forum led the United States to begin a new round of
negotiations in 2008, limited to a relatively small group of like-minded nations,
towards the new so-called Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). The ACTA
treaty was “negotiated largely in secret,” but the “content industries received
privileged access to the negotiations, while telecoms were generally shut out.”270 Yet
Second and Ninth Circuits, who exercise outsized influence in U.S. copyright law), and the contrary
conclusion suggested by Haggart’s book is in error.
264 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 136; cf. Unintended Consequences, supra note 263; Creative
Commons Australia & Organization for Transformative Works, Submission to the Australian
Government’s
Online
Copyright
Infringement
Discussion
Paper
2-4
(2014),
http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/OnlineCopyrightInfringement/OnlineCopyrightInfri
ngement-CreativeCommonsAustraliaAndOrganizationForTransformativeWorks.doc (“Data collected
from the operation of Notice and Takedown procedures under the US DMCA shows it has been
frequently used for the purposes of silencing critical speech or limiting competition.”).
265 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 138.
266 Id. at 140.
267 Id. at 140.
268 Id. at 141; see also id. at 147 (“Given the enduring persistence of US copyright institutions,
DMCA rules on TPMs (and ISP liability, for that matter) would be very hard to reverse.”).
269 See supra notes 252-255 and accompanying text.
270 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 142, 141.
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despite the government’s attempt to silence competing viewpoints, Haggart finds, the
outcome of the ACTA negotiations “was similar in many respects to that of the
Internet treaties,”271 for Europe, Japan, Mexico, and other participants refused to
accept U.S. demands for still-stronger copyright rules along the lines that the White
Paper had recommended, “prefer[ring] language closer to that of the Internet
treaties.”272 Haggart attributes the results to the lack of sufficient economic diversity
among the participants, for by liming the ACTA negotiations to a self-selected group
of (mostly larger and more developed) like-minded nations, the U.S. ceded some of
the bargaining power it ordinarily enjoys when smaller, less-developed countries are
included. The lesson from ACTA, in Haggart’s view, is that there are “real limits to
the US ability to influence international copyright laws” where it “cannot credibly
link IP reform to market access.”273
A third consequence of the WIPO treaties was to increase the profile of copyright
as a domestic and international political issue.
The fact that the Clinton
Administration’s 1994 White Paper had been drafted without input from affected
industry groups marked a departure from past practice in copyright policymaking,
raising concerns that only deepened when the Administration continued to base its
demands before WIPO and Congress on the White Paper’s recommendations. The
U.S. experience since WIPO, Haggart finds, marked the end of copyright as “a
technical and largely apolitical issue,” instead “suggest[ing] that the days of apolitical
inter-industry bargaining to create copyright laws are numbered if not over.”274 Yet,
despite its rising profile, copyright had not yet emerged as an issue of significant
concern to the broader public at the time of the WIPO treaties or the DMCA.
Haggart notes that academic writers and public-interest advocates had begun to
sound warning bells, but that copyright did not emerge as an issue of concern to a
significant portion of the public until the widely covered Napster file-sharing
litigation in 1999 and 2000—by which time the DMCA had already become law.275 It
would take more than a decade before the content industries’ constant push for everstronger protection (using the last high-water mark as their new minimum baseline)
finally provoked a mass public backlash in the United States.276
C. WIPO-Plus-and-Minus: The Canadian Response
Canada’s domestic institutional structure, Haggart writes, affects substantive
copyright law in a way that has no parallel in the United States. In Canada, policy
responsibility is divided between two government institutions with competing
mandates: Industry Canada, whose authority over intellectual property law
represents one component of a broader portfolio centered around the promotion of
innovation and growth; and the Department of Canadian Heritage, which focuses on
Id. at 142.
Id. at 142.
273 Id. at 142.
274 Id. at 145.
275 Id. at 146; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002)
(upholding trial court’s order requiring Napster service to shut down).
276 See supra note 9 (discussing 2012 internet blackout and the ensuing withdrawal of the thenpending SOPA and PIPA legislation).
271
272
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the protection of artists and other creators and seeks generally to maximize their
rights. Thus, Haggart writes, “[t]he departments’ opposing mandates institutionalize
copyright’s user-creator, or protection-dissemination, dichotomy.”277 As a result,
Canadian copyright policy often emerges from inter-agency jockeying, rather than
from negotiation among industries with a vested stake in the outcome as in the
United States.278 Where Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage disagree, conflicts
between the agencies are resolved by the Prime Minister’s Office and Privy Council
Office, which also provide policy direction to the agencies to act in certain ways and
not in others.279 With competing government agencies representing divergent
interests, it is little wonder that Canadian copyright law has long emphasized
balancing the interests of creators and audiences. 280 But Canadian rhetoric began to
shift in the 1980s, when Conservative governments began to push for maximizing
rights for creators of expressive works—a policy prescription that could only redound
to Canada’s economic disadvantage as a net copyright importer. 281 Haggart finds
evidence of clear rhetorical overreach by the Canadian government, whose
statements supporting a maximalist, one-sided approach to copyright galvanized
public opposition.282
Although Canadian industry groups influence the direction of Canadian
copyright policy, the creative sector is a comparatively small part of the Canadian
economy.283 A more significant influence on Canadian policy comes from the United
States, which in recent years has used both diplomatic influence and the threat of
trade sanctions to press for ever-stronger copyright laws in Canada.284 Although
Haggart finds clear signs of attempts by Canadian governments to placate the
United States in setting Canadian copyright rules, he also finds that Canada
exercises substantial autonomy in copyright, because NAFTA sharply limits the
United States’ ability to impose trade sanctions to coerce compliance.285 The example
of Canada’s implementation of the WIPO Internet treaties shows both the reach and
the limits of U.S. influence. Furthermore, the United States’ influence sometimes
pushes Canadian law in contradictory directions—although U.S. pressure on Canada
to strengthen its copyright regime has been constant, Canadian policymakers see the
U.S. DMCA statute as a disastrous experiment and a cautionary example of what not
to do.286
In contrast to the rapid progression in the United States from the White Paper
(1994), to the WIPO Internet treaties (1996), and to the passage of the DMCA (1998),
sixteen years elapsed before Canada finally enacted legislation to implement the
WIPO treaties in 2012. Haggart charts the progress of four Canadian copyright bills
that addressed the subjects of the WIPO treaties: bills C-60 (proposed in 2005), C-61
(2008), C-32 (2010), and the final bill C-11 (2012). Indeed, it took five years for
HAGGART, supra note 1, at 159.
Id. at 158.
279 Id. at 158.
280 Id. at 150-51.
281 Id. at 153-54, 156; see also supra note 231 and accompanying text.
282 Id. at 177-78.
283 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 151-52, 166-69.
284 Id. at 163-66.
285 Id. at 164-65; see also supra note 202 and accompanying text.
286 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 179.
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Canada to even begin considering the WIPO treaties, with a series of papers issued
by the Canadian government in 2001 inviting further debate and consultations over
the issues raised by the treaties.287
The earliest Canadian bills diverged markedly from the DMCA both with
respect to the circumvention of technological protection measures and as to immunity
for online service providers. The Liberal government’s bill C-60 would have barred
TPM circumvention only where infringement resulted, thus legislating precisely the
required “copyright nexus” that Haggart incorrectly identifies in the U.S. DMCA. 288
The bill rejected the DMCA’s “notice-and-takedown” system for online service
provider liability in favor of a less burdensome “notice-and-notice” system, which
required the service provider to inform its subscriber upon receipt of a notice alleging
infringement by the subscriber but did not require the service provider to remove or
disable access to the challenged content.289
The “notice-and-notice” system for online service provider liability survived
intact in all subsequent Canadian copyright bills, finally becoming law with the
passage of bill C-11 in 2012—a reflection, Haggart writes, both of Canadian
independence from United States policy preferences and of the fact that the
Canadian content industries and internet providers are both generally satisfied with
the notice-and-notice regime.290
On the issue of circumventing technological
protection measures, however, the next proposal—bill C-61 in 2008—veered sharply
in the direction of maximalist protection. The bill was introduced by a new
Conservative government that had been elected in 2006 partly upon a pledge to
smooth diplomatic ties with the United States. 291 But the language of the
government’s proposed bill went even beyond the already stringent requirements of
the U.S. DMCA, “making it a crime to break digital locks except under certain
circumstances,” with no periodic “safety valve” for user rights such as the DMCA
provided with its triennial rulemaking procedure. 292 Haggart writes:
Bill C-61 proposed a significant reorientation of Canadian copyright
law towards the US-desired position that the presence of digital locks
should effectively trump user rights, adding a new layer to copyright
that could potentially eliminate any user-owner balance in the law
decided in favour of the owner.293
Unlike the U.S. DMCA, which effectively flew under the public’s radar before being
passed in 1998, Canadian citizens swiftly organized in opposition to bill C-61. Even
before the bill’s text was finalized, Industry Canada’s call for a DMCA-style response
to the WIPO treaties “ended up fomenting widespread public protests that panicked
the government, confounded cabinet colleagues, and led to a 6-month delay in the
bill’s introduction.”294 Opponents to the bill organized themselves on social media,
Id. at 172.
Id. at 178-79; cf. supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
289 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 178-79; see also id. at 23 (explaining the two systems).
290 Id. at 193.
291 Id. at 181-82.
292 Id. at 188.
293 Id. at 188.
294 Id. at 183.
287
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including a highly popular “Fair Copyright for Canada” Facebook page created by
University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist. 295 Citizens organized multiple
meetings with government officials, including a large group who protested the draft
bill at the Christmas Open House held by the Industry Canada minister in 2007.296
The public opposition seems clearly to have caught the Canadian government off
guard, and bill C-61 was withdrawn in the face of an election call in the fall of
2008.297
The defeat of bill C-61, however, appeared to mark the apex of the Canadian
government’s responsiveness to the interests of citizens who opposed the adoption of
strong anti-circumvention rules modeled on the U.S. DMCA.
Although the
Government invited written comments and held several public round-table
discussions on copyright in 2009, yielding public comments that “were
overwhelmingly in favour of stronger user rights,” the resulting bills C-32 and C-11
duplicated bill C-61’s maximalist anti-circumvention provisions in all pertinent
respects.298 The final bills included provisions expressly specifying new user rights;
however, copyright holders who deployed technological measures to protect their
works were not required to permit users to circumvent those measures to exercise
these new rights, leaving them essentially meaningless in the digital arena. 299 The
lesson that Haggart draws from the Canadian government’s acceptance of “WIPOplus” strictures on TPM circumvention is that “the ability of civil-society groups to
influence the course of the debate was constrained by the institutional context within
which Canadian copyright policy is made.”300 The public’s stated opposition to strong
anti-circumvention rules was outweighed by the Prime Minister’s objective of
satisfying the demands for strong protection measures from the U.S. government and
U.S. content producers. In Canada, “[t]he priority accorded to TPMs over user rights,
and of infringement over balance, suggests that while the Conservative government
has learned the importance of paying lip service to user groups, the traditional
protection-oriented copyright interests continue to hold sway.”301 Nevertheless, the
fact that Canada has retained its relatively relaxed notice-and-notice system despite
U.S. demands for notice-and-takedown, and that NAFTA insulates Canada from U.S.
trade pressure, suggests to Haggart that “Canada retains the ability to set its own
copyright policy.”302
D. ¿Quién es WIPO?: The Mexican Response
Mexico, Haggart writes, is a country of two minds when it comes to protecting
copyright. On the one hand, Mexico is a relatively poor country and, by some
measures at least, a net importer of copyrighted works—both characteristics that
HAGGART, supra note 1, at 184.
Id. at 185-86.
297 Id. at 189.
298 Id. at 190.
299 Id. at 191 (“the presence of a digital lock on a work effectively overrides many of these new
user rights”).
300 Id. at 192.
301 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 194.
302 Id. at 198.
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ordinarily correlate with policy preferences for comparatively weak copyright rights.
Yet, Mexico simultaneously sees itself as playing an outsized, highly influential
cultural role on the world stage. Concerns for the protection of cultural heritage have
long been reflected in Mexican law, which draws greatly from the authors’-rights
perspective of Continental Europe, and are expressed in emphatic terms in the
Mexican constitution. Thus, despite sharing economic characteristics with countries
that favor relatively limited copyright rights, Mexico’s history and experience has
tended to place the country much more in the strong-copyright camp, with laws that
(at least formally) rival or even exceed the level of copyright protection that prevails
in the most developed, copyright-exporting nations. Mexico’s poverty, in contrast,
comes into play not at the level of policymaking, but at the level of enforcement;
although Mexican copyright laws are among the world’s strictest, infringement is
punished relatively rarely.303
Mexico adopted copyright reform legislation in 1997 in order to implement its
obligations under NAFTA, but the 1997 legislation did not address the requirements
of the new WIPO treaties. Because Mexico’s formal copyright rights were already
very strong, they were little changed by the 1997 legislation. Mexico’s 1997 law did
extend copyright to new subject matter and also included new provisions addressing
enforcement in order to satisfy U.S. demands. The revisions to Mexican copyright
law made by the 1997 amendments, although substantial, appear to have caused
little controversy.304
In general, the Mexican government shares with the U.S. government a strong
predilection to favor the interests of content producers. In Mexico, the government’s
preferences rest upon a number of factors, including: a corporatist ideology that
remains a powerful vestige of Mexico’s many years under one-party rule; a
historically compliant legislature that raised virtually no dissent when the nation
adopted the world’s longest copyright term (100 years following the death of the
author) in 2003; the influence of content providers, including both foreign
multinationals and domestic producers such as the powerful Televisa company; and
executive agencies who see their own role as serving the needs of artists’ collective
societies—who, in turn, benefit directly from the increased licensing revenues that
stronger and longer copyright protections necessarily bring. 305 Given these many
affinities between Mexican and American copyright policy interests, it is quite
surprising that, nearly twenty years later, Mexico has yet to enact legislation
specifically implementing the provisions of the WIPO Internet treaties. Haggart
devotes chapter 8 of COPYFIGHT to investigating why the significant changes to both
United States and Canadian law that resulted from the WIPO treaties as yet have no
parallel in Mexico.
Under Mexican law, the WIPO Internet treaties are self-executing, and the
government now considers both to be in force in the country. Yet, Mexican law
clearly contains no provisions of direct relevance to some of the key subjects covered
by the treaties. Nothing in the 1997 Mexican copyright statute addressed the
question of online service provider liability for infringing acts of their users—an
unsurprising omission, in view of Mexico’s historically low internet penetration rates.
Id. at 202-09.
Id. at 210-11.
305 Id. at 212-20.
303
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Nor did anything in the statute address the circumvention of technological protection
measures for copyrighted works of any type other than computer software. These
gaps in the Mexican statutory scheme do much, Haggart believes, to explain why a
variety of parties both inside and outside the country have urged Mexico to adopt
additional legislation to implement the provisions of the WIPO internet treaties. 306
COPYFIGHT’s search for an explanation why Mexico has yet to enact legislation
implementing the WIPO Internet treaties ultimately comes up short—partly a
reflection, surely, of the perennial difficulty of proving a negative. The factors
Haggart points to as potentially salient generally tend to support COPYFIGHT’s
broader thesis about the potential for smaller state actors to resist what is frequently
portrayed as the hegemonic dominance of the United States in global intellectual
property law. They are less satisfactory, however, as explanations of why Mexico
should be more resistant to U.S. pressure than was Canada, which adopted WIPO
implementing legislation in 2012. As already noted, Mexican history and cultural
self-image have tended to support very strong intellectual property rights—stronger
even, in some instances, than those provided under United States law. Given these
factors supporting expansion of copyright rights, Mexican reluctance to legislate in
this area demands a stronger explanation than Haggart is able to offer.
Haggart identifies several factors that tend to offset calls for Mexico to
strengthen its copyright laws. First, the Mexican technology sector remains
underdeveloped relative to its American and Canadian counterparts—a
comparatively small portion of the Mexican population has Internet access, and
copyright holders’ concerns consequently focus more on distributions of infringing
content via physical media, a subject not addressed by the WIPO Internet treaties.307
Furthermore, concerns about low Internet penetration rates have influenced Mexican
public policy, with government initiatives now aimed at boosting Internet access to
spur economic growth. Therefore, proposals that risk making Internet access costlier
or less widely available—as would result, for example, from any expansion of ISP
secondary liability—might well draw opposition from other parts of the Mexican
government.308 A hands-off regulatory approach would also be championed by
Telmex, the massive telecommunications monopoly, and its politically well-connected
chief, billionaire Carlos Slim.309 Finally, as with the Canadian example, Haggart
finds, U.S. influence over Mexico is substantially limited by NAFTA. 310
Nevertheless, Haggart expects that the historical and contemporary forces for
strengthening copyright will ultimately prevail, leading Mexico to adopt legislation
implementing at least the anti-circumvention provisions of the WIPO internet
treaties.311
In contrast to both Canada and the United States, Mexican civil-society groups
and public interest advocates have been largely absent from the conversation thus

Id. at 225-26.
See HAGGART, supra note 1, at 228-29.
308 Id. at 216-17.
309 See id. at 222 (noting that Telmex controls over 95% of the Mexican ISP market); id. at
231-32.
310 Id. at 227 (post-NAFTA, the United States can “influence (through training) and lobby, but
not coerce”).
311 Id. at 229-30.
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far.312 Recently, however, Mexico experienced its own public awakening to the effects
of copyright on social welfare, much as the United States did following the Napster
litigation and Canada did in response to Bill C-61.313 In 2010, a very small cadre of
Mexican civil-society advocates—numbering perhaps a dozen in total, but linked via
social media to the broader international intellectual property activist community—
formed a “Stop ACTA” group to oppose Mexico’s participation in the ongoing
negotiations over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. The group skillfully
rallied public opposition, triggering protests against the agreement and provoking
the Mexican Senate to demand that the government provide more information about
the ongoing (but highly secretive) negotiations. The Mexican government then added
fuel to the burgeoning ACTA opposition by stonewalling the Senate’s request and
then defying a Senate resolution calling for the suspension of negotiations. The
Mexican Senate held public hearings at which witnesses attacked both the substance
of the agreement and the secretive conditions in which it was being drafted.
Amazingly, even in the face of growing public opposition, the Mexican government
and the treaty’s content-industry proponents steadfastly refused to engage with the
critics’ arguments.314 Because the pro-ACTA forces had effectively ceded the field,
Haggart writes, “[b]y the working group’s final hearings in July 2011, it was clear
that the copyright establishment had lost both the public opinion and policy battles,
gaining no allies in the Senate or in the wider society.”315 The result was an
unprecedented resolution by the Mexican Senate disapproving ACTA on both
procedural and substantive grounds and calling on President Felipe Calderón not to
sign the treaty.316
Despite the Senate’s vote, however, the Mexican ambassador signed the ACTA
treaty in 2012, and the treaty has generally been “firmly and consistently supported”
by the executive branch of the Mexican government. 317 Haggart takes a glass-halffull perspective on the impact of the Mexican Senate’s anti-ACTA vote, noting that
such a public uproar “would have been unimaginable only two years earlier” and
arguing that “Mexican copyright policymaking has been thrown into turmoil by the
involvement of the telecoms and the public, and by the rediscovery of a paradigm—
development and dissemination—that challenges the dominant protection view of
copyright.”318 The fact that users and civil-society groups have begun to be heard in
Mexican copyright debates, Haggart concludes, “bodes well for the chances for future
copyright reforms.”319
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Both THE COPYRIGHT WARS and COPYFIGHT are richly rewarding works that are
certain to influence future debates over copyright in valuable ways. Teachers of
Id. at 223-24.
See supra notes 275-276, 294-297 and accompanying text.
314 HAGGART, supra note 1, at 232-36.
315 Id. at 236.
316 Id. at 236-37.
317 Id. at 238.
318 Id. at 239.
319 Id. at 241.
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copyright law in the United States may find Baldwin’s book to be a particularly
valuable aid in understanding the very different philosophical premises that animate
European authors’-rights laws, and the many colorful disputes recounted in THE
COPYRIGHT WARS may greatly enliven class discussions of topics that some students
find dull. And advocates seeking to realize meaningful policy change may find
Haggart’s clear-eyed accounting of the political forces in play highly useful in
identifying where to focus reform efforts for the greatest likelihood of success.
Nevertheless, each book has certain shortcomings that informed readers also
should take into consideration. What is particularly noteworthy is the degree to
which each book occasionally reads as a critique of the other. Considering both
works together will substantially aid readers looking for a balanced perspective on
copyright in the digital arena. Identifying a few of the areas of possible improvement
in each book should not, I hope, detract from the overall conclusion that both
Baldwin’s and Haggart’s books are wonderful accomplishments that deserve to find
the widest possible audience.
Baldwin’s THE COPYRIGHT WARS is first and foremost a work of history. Its goals
are descriptive rather than prescriptive, and it lacks the critical perspective of
Haggart’s work. Although Baldwin scrupulously strives for neutrality, accuracy, and
evenhandedness, this chosen perspective occasionally leads THE COPYRIGHT WARS
into descriptions of contemporary phenomena that omit crucial variables. A few
examples should suffice to illuminate the point.
A. Copyright and Technological Advance
For a book that takes as its thesis the lingering effects of past debates on
contemporary copyright discourse, Baldwin’s description of the issues in play in the
digital arena is selective and incomplete. Baldwin acknowledges, for example, the
broad consensus among United States scholars that contemporary copyright law has
grown far stronger and more restrictive than is necessary to serve the purposes of the
law, and that copyright law may now actually be disserving the interests of the
public who were its historical beneficiaries. 320 But Baldwin appears not to grasp the
origin of this scholarly consensus. In Baldwin’s account, “digital anarchists” and
“digital guerrillas” simply do not like paying for things, and the legal “salaried
intelligentsia” who support them are biased against artists because academic authors
need not struggle to make a living from their art. 321 But this misses an enormously
important point that Haggart, in contrast, understands perfectly. The core of the
argument against excessively strong copyright is not, as Baldwin suggests, that it
raises the price of copyrighted goods, but rather that it impedes technological
advance, slows economic growth, and disadvantages industries that may contribute
far more to the economy than Hollywood does. Copyright benefits one set of
industries at the expense not only of “digital anarchists” and the “salaried
intelligentsia,” but of other significant (and growing) industries—propping up past

320 BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 332 (“The consensus in America’s law schools was that copyright
had overreached to damage the public sphere.”).
321 Id. at 334, 375-77.
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creators at the expense of future innovators. This aspect of the modern copyright
critique is missing from THE COPYRIGHT WARS.322
Part of the problem lies in Baldwin’s choice of a single analytical lens through
which to view both past and present disputes. Baldwin describes copyright disputes
as involving the distinct interests of three parties: authors, disseminators, and
audiences.323 Where two of those parties combine against the third, the two usually
win. This analytical construct proves potent in many instances; authors and the
public combined to limit disseminators’ rights in the 18th-century Battle of the
Booksellers, and authors and disseminators have joined forces against the public in
the post-Berne United States. Today’s digital copyright debate, however, offers a less
comfortable fit with Baldwin’s chosen paradigm. The debate today includes “authors
versus other authors” and “disseminators versus technology innovators”—dimensions
of conflict that Baldwin’s methodology is not designed to capture.
B. Copyright, Wages, and Business
Baldwin articulates an understanding of the relationship between technological
change, legal change, creativity, and employment that is less sophisticated in some
ways than Haggart’s. In Baldwin’s view, the digital era has made it too difficult for
artists to make a good living in the ways to which they were accustomed in the past.
He concludes from this that advocates of traditional copyright protections have a
point, and that perhaps such protections should be strengthened in order to permit
artists to continue to make a comfortable living from their works in the digital
arena.324 Haggart, in contrast, applies the same skepticism to defenders of the status
quo that Baldwin reserves for its critics. A comparison of the two perspectives
reveals two distinct shortcomings in Baldwin’s account.
First, Baldwin essentially ignores the positive effects of technological change on
artists. Haggart seems to have little difficulty in locating artists who have taken
advantage of the Internet to find an audience, to build name recognition, and even to
sell their works; while Baldwin seems to despair even of making the effort. 325 The
authors for whom Baldwin expresses sympathy are those who would have created
their works regardless of the existence of the Internet; the possibility that
technological change itself permits forms of creativity to arise that could not have
existed in the pre-digital era is barely mentioned.326 Haggart has less to say
Cf. HAGGART, supra note 1, at 79.
BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 14, 389-92.
324 Id. at 376 (“Digitality has gutted the inherited business models and few new means to earn a
living have emerged.”); see also id. at 374-75 (arguing that historically stronger European copyright
protections afforded more authors an opportunity to make a living from creative endeavor alone
than their comparatively weak United States counterparts).
325 Compare BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 376-77 (pronouncing it unlikely that many creators can
make a living from digital distribution of their works), with HAGGART, supra note 1, at 62
(recognizing that, although digitization has been “both blessing and curse” for authors, many
creators have found it profitable to eliminate the middleman and communicate directly with fans
online, and new organizations have emerged to advocate specifically on behalf of artists, rather than
for the publishers who formerly presumed to speak for them).
326 Even Baldwin’s nod towards the possible favorable impact of the Internet on creative
endeavor is backwards-looking; he portrays the academic fondness for “mash-ups . . . and other
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specifically about creativity as such, but in general seems much more sensitive to
technology’s role in creating new markets, not simply disrupting old ones. 327 Perhaps
the Internet changes which artists prosper, but the notion that it represents a net
drag on creative endeavor seems difficult to credit.
Second, Baldwin’s critique seems to privilege the interests of artists over those of
other actors in the modern information economy. But technology is disrupting
historical labor markets on a vast scale, not merely those involving the creation and
distribution of expressive works. Workers in many industries, not just traditional
intellectual property businesses, are facing an as-yet unsettled future in which
technology increases the array of substitutes for traditional economic inputs and
outputs of many kinds.328 Where technology is wrecking or marginalizing old
markets (while simultaneously, to be sure, creating new ones) across a wide swath of
human endeavor, Baldwin’s support for creators’ historical prerogatives can at times
come across as special pleading on artists’ behalf for an exemption from modernity
itself.
C. Continuity and Change
Baldwin’s thesis, developed and supported throughout THE COPYRIGHT WARS, is
that past conflicts provide a template for current ones, and that even issues that
seem uniquely of today’s moment ultimately echo earlier chapters in copyright’s
lengthy history. Yet one key data point seemingly contradicting, or at least
qualifying, this thesis passes virtually unrecognized. As Haggart’s book astutely
recognizes, the WIPO treaties and the United States’ response marked a significant
point of departure, not continuity, with past copyright practice. Baldwin identifies no
pastiches” as “a return to the participatory culture of the era when music was played and not just
listened to.” BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 327; see generally id. at 326-29. Yet it seems more accurate
to say that the Internet also enables at least some forms of expression that would have been
impossible in the pre-digital era, not mere rediscovery of past forms. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet,
Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2133
(2011); David E. Ashley, The Public as Creator and Infringer: Copyright Law Applied to the Creators
of User-Generated Video Content, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 563, 571-78 (2010)
(collecting examples). For a concrete illustration, consider the works of the Israeli performer known
as Kutiman, whose “ThruYou” series of online videos dissect and reassemble snippets (sometimes
only a single note in length) of dozens of musical performances posted by both amateur and
professional musicians from around the world. The result is something greater than the sum of its
constituent parts: a song that none of the performers who appear in the video is actually playing and
which exists only because of creative choices made during editing. See, e.g., Kutiman, Give It Up,
YOUTUBE, https://youtu.be/WoHxoz_0ykI (Sept. 12, 2014); WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT
101-02 (2011) (citing further examples).
327 See HAGGART, supra note 1, at 59, 61-62, 65.
328 See, e.g., Guia Marie Del Prado, Lawyers are just as likely to lose their jobs to robots as truck
drivers and factory workers, TECH INSIDER, (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.techinsider.io/robots-maymake-legal-workers-obsolete-2015-8 [http://perma.cc/SHP3-P4FA]; Josefin Smeds, Are Jobs Coming
or
Going
in
the
Digital
Age?,
SMARTER
TOGETHER,
(June
29,
2015),
http://smartertogether.telenorconnexion.com/2015/06/are-jobs-coming-or-going-in-the-digital-age/
[http://perma.cc/4A88-7LRP]; Cadie Thompson, We’ve reached a tipping point where technology is
now destroying more jobs than it creates, researcher warns, BUS. INSIDER, (June 3, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/technology-is-destroying-jobs-and-it-could-spur-a-global-crisis-20156 [http://perma.cc/7C7A-D62Q].
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period in history (certainly not the eighteenth-century Battle of the Booksellers,
Baldwin’s often-invoked exemplar of a “copyright war”) when authors successfully
demanded the right to limit mere reading, not copying, of their works. Yet the
DMCA, at least as construed by the Second and Ninth Circuits, appears to create a
new right on copyright holders’ part to regulate mere access to their works
irrespective of whether infringement follows. Haggart fears, with some justification,
that what began as an unprecedented expansion of copyright holders’ power to
control access to their works will became accepted as the new baseline for further
expansions of rights holders’ interests at the expense of the public. By portraying
contemporary debates as mere reruns of those lost past, however, Baldwin misses
this critical distinction.
D. History and Critical Distance
Finally, although Baldwin’s historical perspective strives for neutrality and
generally achieves it, readers looking for greater critical engagement with the ideas
under discussion may come away disappointed. Taking pains to avoid being seen to
favor one side over another may well increase THE COPYRIGHT WARS’ credibility as an
evenhanded accounting of the ebb and flow of copyright thinking over time, but it
simultaneously permits some seemingly weak ideas to pass by unremarked upon.
The best example may be found in the book’s treatment of the authors’-rights
ideology, which THE COPYRIGHT WARS manages to describe without meaningfully
grappling with issues that an informed reader will find immediately apparent.
Consider the implications for democratic governance on copyright policy: in political
systems resting upon the consent of the governed, citizens may justifiably decide to
bear copyright’s costs in the hope of securing its promised benefits. Yet from the
authors’-rights perspective, at least as Baldwin summarizes it, it is apparently
considered out of bounds even to ask what benefit citizens derive from copyright
policy, for only authors’ interests count in the calculus. Yet to exclude the interests
of ordinary citizens from consideration in policymaking raises challenging questions
about whether the authors’-rights philosophy is antidemocratic. 329 To put it slightly
differently: what do citizens receive in return for bearing the costs imposed by
copyright’s long-term exclusion of expressive works from the public domain? For
nations that follow the copyright approach, the answer is simple: eventual free access
to a greater corpus of expressive works than would otherwise exist. The fact that the
authors’-rights approach appears to have no answer except to deny the validity of the
question is hardly a point in its favor, but such critical analysis lies outside THE
COPYRIGHT WARS’ scope.
Similarly, the book’s account of some very contentious issues occasionally seems
credulously deferential toward assertions made by interested parties to deflect
criticism. Baldwin’s discussion of the DMCA may be summarized, with tolerable
accuracy, as although some people feared that the DMCA would curtail fair use,
Congress said it was fixing the DMCA to make sure that would not happen, therefore
329 Cf. BALDWIN, supra note 6, at 386-87 (noting that basic tenets of authors’-rights philosophy
developed in Europe before democracy became widespread, but not addressing why those tenets
were not widely challenged as Europe democratized).
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the DMCA does not curtail fair use.330 Similarly, Baldwin’s discussion of the
implications of property theory for copyright simply states that policymakers have
used property theory to justify both alienability and inalienability without grappling
with the inconsistency between the two.331 The list could go on. The possibility that
policymakers don’t always mean what they say, but sometimes deploy rhetoric
opportunistically to give a veneer of justification where it may not be warranted,
seems not to be recognized at any point in THE COPYRIGHT WARS; participants’
rhetoric (even disingenuous rhetoric) is reported accurately, but seldom questioned.
The book’s lack of critical perspective shows most strongly in the chapter on
fascism, which surely does less than any other portion of THE COPYRIGHT WARS to
advance Baldwin’s thesis about the links between past and contemporary debates.
The problem lies partly in a choice of emphasis, for the countries Baldwin selects as
exemplars of the authors’-rights perspective—France and Germany—did very little
with copyright law during the war years. The chapter’s detailed recounting of
competing unenacted German legislative proposals teaches very little of value to
Baldwin’s thesis. The problem is not simply that none of the empty statements made
by Nazi officialdom to prop up a government of arbitrary terror constituted law under
any reasonable understanding of that term, although that is part of it.332 The
broader difficulty is that unenacted legislation says virtually nothing about where
the center of gravity actually lies at any given moment. For example, a few years ago
Congress considered competing legislative proposals on the question whether federal
agencies should make taxpayer-funded research publicly available online in openaccess repositories—one bill would have required the practice, and the other would
have outlawed it.333 Neither bill passed. What conclusions, if any, may future
scholars draw about the 111th Congress’s views on open access to federally funded
research, except that the issue remained unsettled? To point to either proposal as a
validation of future legislation would be granting undue weight to the still-inchoate
musings of a handful of legislators. It seems comparably fruitless to seek value from
the back-and-forth of unenacted Nazi copyright proposals, and the resultant gain in
understanding is less than proportionate to the number of pages THE COPYRIGHT
WARS devotes to the task.
Haggart’s COPYFIGHT eschews Baldwin’s historical perspective in favor of a close
examination of developments occurring in the past two decades in three nations. The
more limited scale proves both a help and a hindrance. On the one hand, Haggart
more clearly grasps what is uniquely modern about the contemporary copyright
debate; he demonstrates in clear terms that the issues in dispute post-WIPO era
differ in fundamental respects from those that preceded it. The focus on the modern
North American copyright debate, however, occasionally leads Haggart to overstate
the implications of his thesis, despite COPYFIGHT’s generally cautious approach to
drawing inferences from a small number of historical data points.

See generally supra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39-41, 86-89, and accompanying text.
332 See FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM
440-51 (2d ed. 1944).
333 Compare H.R. 801, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009), with S. 1373, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009).
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E. Short-Term Openness and Long-Term Constraint
At multiple junctures Haggart emphasizes that there is nothing inevitable about
the inherited structures of North American copyright policy; that the laws we happen
to have today simply represent choices made by past policymakers, not unalterable
natural truths; and that nothing prevents future policymakers from reorienting
copyright policy in a way more hospitable to technology providers’ and consumers’
interests. Baldwin’s analysis, however, demonstrates that policymakers’ past choices
(and, necessarily, their future ones) are in fact bounded by both philosophical and
practical constraints.
For example, writing of the United States’ decision to leverage copyright as a
new tool of international trade policy in the 1970s and 1980s, Haggart writes that
“[t]here is nothing inherent in IP that requires it to be defined as a trade issue rather
than, for example, a purely domestic regulatory policy.”334 Given the Berne
Convention and the very lengthy history of international negotiations over copyright
recounted in Baldwin’s work, however, a reader might very well conclude that it was
entirely foreseeable, even inevitable, that copyright would come to be a contentious
trade issue as global markets for the import and export of expressive works matured.
Perhaps it was not inevitable that the United States would yoke copyright policy to
the WTO trading system via the TRIPS Agreement, thereby enabling bigger
countries to threaten smaller ones with trade sanctions if they did not bring their
domestic copyright laws up to the standards favored by the large copyright-exporting
nations; but Baldwin’s historical account suggests a much deeper and firmer linkage
between copyright and trade than Haggart imagines.
Baldwin’s analysis also teaches much more than Haggart’s about the value of
having a fairly deep theory of what copyright is for in order guide policy in a way that
makes sense. Without a robust set of foundational principles, copyright becomes a
law that simply responds to whichever political winds happen to be blowing at a
particular moment in time. The harms this has already caused to copyright policy
are well understood; indeed, Haggart documents some of them himself. When the
United States began to grow concerned about the ballooning trade deficit and
declining manufacturing exports, copyright was reborn as a trade issue; more
recently, during the economic recession that began in the last decade, policymakers
began to speak glowingly of the effects of intellectual property law on labor and
employment levels.335 The longer historical time horizon adopted in Baldwin’s work
provides a firmer basis for critiquing such short-term policy choices than does
anything in COPYFIGHT.
F. Policy Autonomy and Trade
Haggart’s thesis is that, to a broader extent than is commonly recognized,
smaller nations are not simply “policy takers” compelled to serve the interests of
HAGGART, supra note 1, at 46.
See Tim Armstrong, The Emerging “IP is All About Jobs” Meme, INFO/LAW, (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2011/08/08/the-emerging-ip-is-all-about-jobs-meme/
[http://perma.cc/4R6T-QUXY].
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large copyright exporters such as the United States. One might quarrel with some of
the evidence COPYFIGHT marshals in support of this conclusion, however. First, as
Haggart recognizes, both of the smaller countries he has chosen to focus on—Canada
and Mexico—are situated quite differently from other smaller countries insofar as
the United States has already ceded a good deal of its influence under NAFTA.
COPYFIGHT offers comparatively little evidence that the much larger group of
countries who have not yet concluded a free-trade agreement with the United States
may maintain similar autonomy. Second, the Canadian example provides fairly
equivocal support to Haggart’s independence thesis; the same events might as readily
be explained as demonstrating U.S. influence rather than its opposite. A proposed
bill that would have significantly departed from U.S. preferences was defeated in
favor of a bill that, at least in its anti-circumvention provisions and despite public
opposition, appeared tailored to meet U.S. demands. 336 The process, perhaps,
reflected Canadian autonomy, but it is not easy to say the same of the substance of
the final Canadian law.
Indeed, and perhaps perversely, Haggart’s analysis, if accurate, suggests an
approach smaller countries may use to insulate themselves from U.S. pressure that
is essentially the opposite of the one that civil-society groups (towards whom Haggart
appears generally sympathetic) recommend. Perhaps the best strategy for U.S. trade
partners is simply to accede to U.S. demands today in exchange for a free-trade
agreement, forestalling the more extreme demands the U.S. is sure to make
tomorrow. That would surely be a bizarre result from the perspective of maintaining
copyright’s historical center of gravity and would produce instead a strong lurch
towards greater lockdown and control over works by rights holders; but it would, at
least, strengthen the parallels between the Canadian and Mexican examples and the
rest of the world and offer an avenue for preserving future policy autonomy.
COPYFIGHT, for better or worse, takes no account of this unsettling but logical
implication of its own argument.
G. The Direction of Future Debates
COPYFIGHT reckons, as it must, with the reality that attempts to reorient
Canadian and Mexican copyright law in more pro-consumer directions post-WIPO
have thus far yielded more rhetoric than action. The awakening of consumer
awareness over the effects of stringent copyright regulation that Haggart documents,
at different points, in the United States, Canada, and Mexico is surely beneficial. A
skeptic may wonder, however, whether COPYFIGHT places undue emphasis on
changing the tenor of discussion as opposed to actual substantive policy outcomes.
Both the discussions of Canada’s and Mexico’s responses to WIPO appear to follow a
similar pattern: the government proposed an anti-consumer law (or, in Mexico’s case,
a treaty), members of the public organized in opposition, and the result was that law
passed anyway; but perhaps the next debate will occur on different terms. Changing
the debate, however important, is not the same as changing the law. At some point,
public agitation against legislative or executive overreach must achieve a tangible
result in order to maintain credibility. It is speculative to think that the content336

See supra notes 288-301 and accompanying text.
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industry lobbyists who successfully overcame the objections of public-interest
advocates to pass Canada’s bill C-11 in 2012 will believe themselves more, rather
than less, obliged to account for users’ desires during the next battle when it comes.
The clearest example Haggart develops of users organizing to defeat maximalist
copyright legislation is the uprising, culminating in the January 2012 “internet
blackout,” that led Congress to withdraw the SOPA and PIPA bills in the United
States. As with the Canadian and Mexican examples, Haggart sees in the
SOPA/PIPA protests the seeds of lasting policy change. But the “internet blackout”
was self-evidently a tactic, not a strategy; it cannot be repeated ad infinitum in
response to future ill-conceived legislative proposals without losing the qualities that
made it effective.
Change, in Haggart’s historical-institutionalist framework,
ultimately requires institutions, which can exercise sufficient pressure to defeat the
policy inertia of path dependence. COPYFIGHT, however, devotes little effort to
documenting how institutional actors are channeling the energies that succeeded in
derailing SOPA and PIPA to ensure that they do not dissipate when the next round
of maximalist legislative proposals arise. What new institutions arose from the 2012
“internet blackout”? The answer would appear to be critically relevant to sustaining
COPYFIGHT’s thesis that we have passed an inflection point in the extent of end-user
influence over future copyright policy, but the book has little to say on the subject.
None of these critiques should detract from the fact that both THE COPYRIGHT
WARS and COPYFIGHT are outstanding books that deserve and reward careful study.
Both make significant contributions to the literature on copyright, and they are welltimed to influence the course of discussions as Congress begins debating major
copyright revision for the first time in more than a generation. Heeding their many
insights will do much to rationalize and improve copyright policy in this country and
beyond.

